


JPRS 80300

11 March 1982

# West Europe Report

No. 1921



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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## MILITARY-LIKE PREPARATION SEEN IN NUCLEAR PLANT ATTACKS

Paris LE POINT in French 25 Jan 82 pp 61-62

[Article by Roland Mihail]

[Text] The attack on the Creys-Malville breeder reactor in Isere was obviously not the work of amateurs. The unknown persons who attacked the huge concrete fortress from the other side of the Rhone River used a Soviet-made RPG-7V antitank rocket launcher dating from 1963--a weapon sometimes found in Lebanon or Northern Ireland.

It was 2330 hours on Monday, 18 January, and the clear night made the huge tower that will house the breeder reactor in 1984 even more visible. About 20 workers were at work inside the building. Suddenly there were five explosions. "Real artillery fire, as though war were breaking out," said a farmer from Flevieu whose house is less than 800 meters from the powerplant.

Alerted immediately by the national police, explosives experts from the 4th Light Infantry Regiment in La Valbonne arrived and decided to inspect every nook and cranny of the worksite using searchlights. Four impact sites were finally discovered on Tuesday morning: one on a hoisting device and three in the blockhouse-like building's concrete, none larger than a man's fist.

In fact, the breeder reactor--the miracle machine that will produce more plutonium than it consumes--had not suffered any serious damage. And the reason why only big scratches were found on it is that the targeted reactor has a shell so thick that theoretically, it could resist the impact of an airplane falling on it. Things could have turned out differently. The fire was so accurate that the attackers obviously intended to shoot the rockets in through an aperture in the tower that is not only open but also lit up at night, since work is going on inside. In short, they intended to lodge their projectiles right inside the reactor building. Fortunately, no one was injured, although one of the projectiles landed about 20 meters from one worker. But investigators are not ruling out the possibility that some of the employees were accomplices.

This is not the first attack on a nuclear facility in France. The fact is that a new kind of crime has appeared recently--that of the nuclear age. From thefts of radioactive materials to attacks on trains and assaults, the annals of crime are beginning to be filled with the misdeeds of the new "atomic terrorists."

In the spring of 1979, members of CRANE (Ecologist Antinuclear Revolutionary Cell) stole 14 irradiated--and faintly radioactive--plates from the Lyon-I laboratories, where they were being used for practical work by students. In the following days, those plates were found. They had been placed in a mailbox at the daily newspaper LE PROGRES DE LYON and in police stations, department stores, the subway, and under the windshield wipers of two cars. And even in Simone Veil's campaign headquarters (she was a candidate in the European elections at the time). There was no doubt that the perpetrators of the theft wanted to prove through their dangerous game that it was possible to use atoms to keep the police and the public on tenterhooks.

There was the same "science-fission" scenario on Friday 8 February 1980. At about 0300 hours, three masked commandos intercepted a train carrying radioactive waste to the La Hague plant. A few kilometers before the Bayeux station was reached, they used traffic signals to force the train's engineer to stop. After blackening two of the train's cars with slogans--"No to nuclear"--the three men severed the brake cables and disappeared into the night. That Friday evening, a self-styled "resistance to nuclearization" movement that no one had ever heard of claimed responsibility for the incident.

Attacks on nuclear installations like the one at Creys-Malville are much more frequent and have been very expensive. In May 1975, two bombs delayed completion of the Fessenheim nuclear powerplant in Alsace by several months. The following month, the main computer at FRAMATOME [Franco-American Atomic Construction Company]--which builds the French powerplants--was destroyed in Courbevoie. Later in Argenteuil, the same firm's valve testing shop was damaged. In August 1975, two bombs forced the temporary closing of the Brennilis powerplant in Finisterre. In November 1976, it was the turn of the Paris offices of a company that produces nuclear fuels and of the electronic control room at the uranium mine at Magnac in Haute-Vienne. In October 1979, the cables in a control room at the European uranium enrichment plant (EURODIF [European Diffusion Agency], in Tricastin) were cut. In February 1981, an attack in Ain destroyed an EDF [French Electric Power Company] pylon connected to the Bugey powerplant.

There is no end to the list of damages suffered by nuclear powerplants in France. And even though responsibility is claimed by organizations with fanciful names--CRANE, Super-Man (Antinuclear Movement), LUPEN (Uranic Washing of Nuclear Promoters), or CACA (Action Committees Against Atomic Scum)--those attacks often testify to real technical competence and even, according to several specialists, almost military preparation.

Local and national police are becoming increasingly concerned. In the past 2 years, some of their officials have been given the job of gathering every bit of information on the subject. A year ago, police officers were highly intrigued by the presence on many antinuclear committees of militant anarchists from the Libertarian Communist Organization (OCL), which has about 1,000 members. And last 12 December, they were on the alert because of a demonstration by about 40 members of the regional group opposing the Super Phenix, who had cut the wire fence at the Creys worksite and promised more violent action.

But the mission of the police does not stop there. It also consists of cooperating with departments of the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] in analyzing information

with a view to devising possible technical responses and reviewing the design of the powerplants to cope with this new danger: strengthening the confining enclosures and installing reinforced doors and detection rigs.

Until now, only the AEC's installations, where national defense research is done, have their own watchmen--nearly 1,000 armed men in the Local Security Forces (FLS). But the EDF, which operates the powerplants, has no armed guards at all--unlike its counterparts in the United States. One specialist explains: "Here we are in the civilian sector. And the EDF's unions have always been hostile to the security guard firms." The result: if commandos attack a powerplant, the watchmen will have to hold them with their bare hands until the police arrive!

The Ministry of Interior has naturally measured the response times of police stationed near the powerplants. But some of the response times--2 hours--are far from setting any speed records! So not long ago, a solution was found for some of the sites: national police--from 8 to 25 for each facility--patrol the outside of the powerplants in a no man's land surrounded by barbed wire.

In fact, protective measures are being adopted everywhere. In Belgium, a special force of 246 national police is assigned to guard the three powerplants. In Great Britain, patrols escort trains carrying radioactive waste. In Germany, various interministerial councils have been grilled on the subject.

But in France, things have never gone that far. And that is foolish, because with the development of the nuclear program, a growing number of powerplants (currently 31) are in operation. Being technological symbols in the same class as computers, those installations are definitely becoming the new targets for modern-day terrorists.

11798

CSO: 3100/317

## CONTACTS REPORTED BETWEEN GREEK, ITALIAN TERRORISTS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 12 Feb 82 p 1

[Article by G. Trangas]

[Text] The KYP [Central Intelligence Service] (and other intelligence services of NATO member countries) have recently noted the presence in our country of members of the Red Brigades who established contacts with leaders of well-known extremist groups and anarchic elements.

KYP officers (but also officers of the Italian secret services) believe that the Italian terrorists (those remaining from the "decimated" legions of the Red Brigades) are attempting to establish hiding places in Greece, as well as caches where it would be possible to hide for significant periods of time those weapons coming from Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries. Western intelligence services maintain that "the KGB and Qadhdhafi are aiming at regrouping the Italian terrorists." They add, moreover, that "it is a well-known fact that Beirut is one of the centers of Soviet spy organizations."

Additionally, Italian police have disclosed that one of the Red Brigade members who was arrested, Luigi P. Scricciolo, had come to Athens in 1979, where he had attempted to locate adequate hiding places for his organization.

According to information obtained by our newspaper, the KYP had succeeded in spotting him and monitoring all his contacts, as well as those made by other Italian terrorists with Athens anarchic individuals (both known and unknown up to that time), some of whom had already been arrested or tried for various crimes. According to the same information, Scricciolo had met with individuals who travel to the Middle East and especially to Lebanon and Libya.

The KYP has sent a report to the Italian secret services, which, in turn, have informed Greek authorities about the activities and contacts of Greek extremists in Italy.

CSO: 4621/208



## BRIEFS

OIL-PRODUCTS CONSUMPTION DROPS--Consumption of petroleum products continues to drop. Last year the decline was 6 percent compared to the previous year, according to statistics compiled by the Petroleum Industry's Central Association. Last year a total of 10.5 million tons of petroleum products was sold in Finland. Sales have dropped by 13 percent in 2 years. During the same period energy consumption increased by 1 percent annually. The decreased dependence on oil is partly a result of conservation and partly due to the replacement of oil by other forms of energy. Last year oil accounted for 42 percent of Finland's total energy consumption. This means a decrease of 3 percent in one year. Finland is one of the industrialized countries that uses the least oil. Gasoline sales rose by 0.7 percent last year, but gasoline consumption is still at the same level as in 1975, even though the number of automobiles in Finland has increased by 250,000 since that time. Cars have better fuel economy than previously and, in addition, high taxes have reduced consumption. Another reason why gasoline consumption has remained the same is that engine petroleum sales have risen sharply. Last year the increase was 136 percent and all indications are that this increase will continue. Sales of diesel fuel increased last year by just over 2 percent. Sales of both light and heavy fuel oil dropped, however. The decrease was 10 percent and 9 percent, respectively. The popularity of oil for heating single-family dwellings has decreased and only 10 percent of the houses built last year used oil heating. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 10 Feb 82 p 13] 9336

CSO: 3109/104



## CONSEQUENCES, IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCED WORKWEEK DISCUSSED

## Experts Give Opinions

Paris LE POINT in French 18-24 Jan 82 pp 38-40

[Interview with Christian Goux and Raymond Soubie: "Working Our Reduction--Two Experts, Face to Face"; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Along with the 39-hour workweek and the solidarity contracts, the cabinet last week adopted the first ordinances on employment. Reduction in unemployment had been the central topic of the election campaign and this today is the Mauroy's number-one challenge. But does a reduction in working hours create jobs and under what conditions? To answer these questions, LE POINT invited two experts: on the one hand, Christian Goux, Socialist deputy from Var, chairman of the Finance Committee, and one of Francois Mitterrand's economic advisors; on the other hand, Raymond Soubie, former advisor to Raymond Barre for social affairs, today associate professor at the Paris-Sorbonne University, at the CELSA (Center of Higher Applied Literary Studies).

Question: In just 7 months, the Socialist administration has taken a whole series of measures in the area of working hours which ends this week with the ordinances. Raymond Soubie, what do you think about that?

Raymond Soubie: I would say first of all that I am speaking here as a university professor and not as a representative of one or the other political force. Having said this, a reduction in working hours is not a new subject. We have had a reduction in the workweek by about 5 hours since 1970. The return to the 40-hour workweek became a reality early in 1981. This was done progressively, regularly, and in a negotiated fashion without any loss of income to wage earners. The real question now is this: how do we continue or speed up the reduction in working hours in order to reduce unemployment? With negotiations launched in 1979, the Giraudet report, requested by Raymond Barre, came out with specific solutions. The Socialist administration is essentially reviving them. How could I be anything but happy!

Christian Goux: Without getting into polemics I would simply like to note that the political change has gotten things moving again. These negotiations on working hours had been dragging on for more than 3 years. We completed them in less than 6 months.

R.S. [Raymond Soubie]: I must emphasize that the July 1981 agreement between the employers and the labor unions would not have come about without a prior period of maturation. As a matter of fact, in this agreement, the labor unions exchanged social advantages for certain streamlining steps granted the enterprise managers in regard to work organization. This "give-and-take" is a "first" in our social history. And the basic principle of that was worked out over a period of many months.

C.G. [Christian Goux]: Yes, but this is a consequence of 10 May. The labor unions realize that, in terms of the administration's approach to the whole thing, this is a weapon to fight against unemployment.

Question: So, does this mean that just a 1-hour reduction in the workweek would create jobs?

C.G.: There are three things we must realize here. First of all, we must look at what the economic models tell us. Theoretically, a reduction by 1 hour every year should create 150,000 jobs at the end of a year and 200,000 jobs at the end of 3 years. These of course are only estimates and I know very well that things in reality do not work out as mechanically as that. But--and this is my second point --the administration is not basing its entire policy on the 39-hour work week. There is in effect a whole series of other measures provided here, such as the 5th week of paid leave, the fifth team, early retirement, solidarity contracts, etc. These also create jobs. Finally--and this is evidently indispensable--there will be no decline in unemployment without a sustained growth rate which we have fixed at 3 percent. This is a necessary and reasonable objective and I believe that we will attain it.

Question: Overall, what results do you expect from this setup?

C.G.: I think that we will not reach the 2-million unemployed level in terms of figures corrected for seasonal variation. Unemployment should decline, starting in 1983. As I see it, the reversal of the curve will be decisive because it will have a galvanizing effect both on the workers and on the enterprise managers.

Question: And you, Raymond Soubie, do you share this analysis?

R.S.: Economic studies as a matter of fact show that one can create jobs by reducing working hours but under two capital conditions which Christian Goux did not mention. The first one is that the production capacities of the enterprises must be maintained and even increased. The second one is that a reduction in working hours must be accompanied by a proportional cut in wages. Conversely, if these two conditions are not met, the same studies reveal that we will rapidly experience an increase in unemployment due to the rise in production costs and the reduced competitiveness of the enterprises.

Now, what do the agreements so far concluded in the various branches provide for? They rather well meet the first condition, accepting better utilization of the entire production machinery. But none of them or almost none of them contain the

idea that the working hour or the two working hours removed in terms of working time must no longer be completely remunerated, as if they had actually been put in. On 12 June, Pierre Mauroy said: "If wage compensation were to have to be total, that is to say, if we were to try to make sure that, in a new job sharing plan, more workers could share the same income among each other without any loss to anybody, then we would be fooling everybody."

Basically, there are two things which we can do. We can either have agreements on social progress which reduce working hours without income loss but without any effect on jobs. Or we can have agreements to implement a real unemployment reduction together with a major reduction in working hours, accompanied by a wage cut. Why did you not pick this second way?

C.G.: Personally, I would, at least in certain industry branches, have preferred a bigger reduction. But do not forget that we are in a dynamic situation. The employees know that. They know that by 1985 we are going to have 35 hours and they will take this new fact into consideration. This will lead them to a work reorganization in their enterprises which will yield productivity gains.

Without productivity gains, of course, compensation must be total, that is to say, if a man works one hour less, he gets one hour less in wages. On the other hand, if we have 4-5 percent in productivity gains, the workers can agree that their purchasing power will go up only 2-3 percent, with the rest being used as the kind of compensation which Pierre Mauroy was talking about. One portion of these gains would thus go to the workers and the other one would go to the enterprise.

This battle of course cannot be won in a stagnant economy. Moreover, the experiment which we are now attempting is entirely new, entirely original, and I certainly hope that the European countries, which are helpless against unemployment, will follow us.

R.S.: I wonder whether you are not living through the adventure of Christopher Columbus. You started out in search of the Indies--a reduction in working hours to reduce unemployment--and you discovered America: a reduction in working hours which would above all benefit workers who have a job. But the Indies remain yet to be discovered. I am happy over the agreements that were concluded. They express the spirit of responsibility and the open-minded attitude of the social partners. They are a victory for the administration. They represent social progress but they mean much more for workers who have jobs than for those who do not have jobs.

The Socialist administration is benefiting from a remarkably high level of popularity. Would this not be the moment for it to confront the country with the problem of work and income sharing, the time to talk loud and clear in the name of the unemployed?

C.G.: The unemployed are more represented than you think. On the local levels of government, for example, the elected officials permanently are aware of the restlessness of the unemployed. In the enterprises I am sure that the labor unions know that the workers also make their contributions to the reduction in unemployment. Besides, with the nationalized sector, we will have ideal territory for setting the example.

R.S.: I repeat, there will be no significant reduction in unemployment without income sharing. Everybody, by the way, knows that: the government, just like the employers and the labor unions. But it is extremely difficult for the labor unions to accept the specific consequences of this because they would then stick their fingers into the gears of income policy. If the administration wants to win this game, it must therefore provide the impetus.

C.G.: No, that is not its role. France is not a German-style social democracy and Mr Soubie knows that very well, by the way.

R.S.: Yes, yes, I do know that. But that only entails inconveniences.

C.G.: The administration must allow the social partners to meet face to face for free negotiations while repeating every day that a reduction in unemployment is its primary objective. The workers are responsible people and they understand quite well that certain arrangements are necessary. But this will be negotiated branch by branch, enterprise by enterprise. Income sharing is a real problem but it must not be tackled only from the angle of wage compensation.

R.S.: I am worried about the future. In certain branches, productivity gains will permit both a rise in incomes and a reduction in working hours. In others, more archaic, this will not be possible. We will thus be facing a double evolution. Now, I believe that a society can accept many things except inequalities which at a point become insupportable. Hence, the only way to get out of this is to modify the distribution mechanism. Who can do that, if not the government?

C.G.: I am entirely in agreement with you that it is the big issue of inequalities which has been poisoning French society for 20 years. But this goes far beyond the problem of wage compensation! The administration intends to tackle the issue from every direction. Tax reform, income spread reduction, and reform of social security are the major thrusts of that policy.

R.S.: The French are running the risk of being forced to choose between an improvement in employment and the maintenance of the standard of living. The entire question is to figure out to what degree our companies are capable of solidarity so that there will be less unemployed.

C.G.: Solidarity is possible if there is maintenance of the average living standard, accompanied by a real income redistribution.

R.S.: You cannot promise everything all at once. This kind of policy will be coherent only at the cost of an increased redistribution effort and a rise in social and fiscal expenditures for certain categories, especially supervisory personnel and the middle classes. One can certainly make this choice in the name of solidarity. But then you have to say so. I get the impression that we are already gently heading in that direction--but without saying too much about it.

C.G.: You did that before us! Social and treasury expenditures kept going up during the preceding 7-year administration. But--and this is the real question here--in this field one could not go beyond a certain limit which would be tolerated neither by the citizens, nor by the enterprises. The state must now redistribute the burdens with more justice. This of course will call for a stepped-up redistribution effort.



## New Law's Implications

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 1 Feb 82 pp 39-40

[Article by Claude Bunodiere and Henri Gibier: "How to Read the New Ordinances on Working Hours"]

[Text] After 6 months of coordination and conflict, the government machinery is turning out the new rules of the social game at full speed. LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE reviews measures concerning the employees and the unions.

The 39-hour workweek starts on 1 February? Six columns in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL, 33 articles, and many more paragraphs. What about the Auroux report? "One hundred and forty measures taken separately," in the opinion of Mr Yvon Chotard, the social affairs advisor of the employers, and five bills concocted in the Ministry of Labor in the guise of hors-d'oeuvres, starting this week. Not including one ordinance on solidarity contracts and two on temporary jobs. After 6 months of conferences and conflicts, of persuasion and apprehension, the government machinery is grinding out the new rules of the social game at full speed.

There is abundant technocratic literature which will leave more than just one employer confused. While everything has been covered, nothing has been definitely settled. The point of departure established by the administration is 1 February. But a whole series of measures, starting with the annual working hour setup (see table [not included]) cannot be implemented before June, the date scheduled for the publication of the last implementation decrees. "This is an indication of our determination to revive contract policy," it was explained at Matignon Palace where they are trying to reconcile economic coherence and the consideration of social complexity.

This is a subtle dialectic which today forces the administration to decree negotiations by ordinance and which forces the employees and the unions into an uncomfortable face-to-face setup.

Uncomfortable for the employers who can no longer blame the government if their expenditures go up excessively to the detriment of their competitiveness; they have no choice regarding the 39-hour workweek but nobody forces them to make compensation completely for the 40th. On the contrary, the Ministry of Labor urges them to benefit from that in order to put their wage scales back in order. But they must explain to their employees the constraints of profitability and competition: the Auroux report, which makes the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] bristle, is precisely in favor of economic information in the enterprise. Uncomfortable also for the "pure and tough" labor unions who find it rather easy--as one of the drafters of the ordinance remarked so ironically--to let the "FO [Workers Force] and the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel] handle the whole mess." Today, being against an agreement would necessitate going it alone; if, in a particular establishment, the labor unions hostile to an agreement represent no more than 50 percent of the registered members, the agreement would go into effect just the same and those in opposition would only have proof of the fact that they are not representatives. This arrangement would bother everybody. "We deprived both camps of their traditional alibis," it was explained at Matignon.

Specifically, the first four effects of this new state of mind would appear first of all in the area of working hours. With the exception of 8 obligatory days of vacation, almost all of the new provisions remain to be negotiated before being implemented. In most cases, negotiations, even when conducted on the lowest level --the enterprise level or the establishment level--will always lead to the common law. The only exceptions in the beginning will involve the sacrosanct ban on Sunday work and night-time work for women, in other words, provisions which can be violated only through an agreement on the professional job category level.

With its formalist and regulation-oriented tradition, the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] is thus losing all along the line. But, as the provisions in the various paragraphs would have it, the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], the FO, or the CGC are also getting hit. As for the employers, the ardent defenders of a return to negotiations in the enterprise well before 10 May, there are only two real reasons for discontent: the rather noticeable rise in the cost of additional working hours [overtime hours] along with the new system of compensatory rest (see table [not included]) and the process of having to go down to 35 hours starting in 1983 for full-time workers. Inclined to negotiate without too much chagrin over the 39-hour work week, the CNPF received the second "social train" of last Wednesday with much more worry. The two ordinances which spell out a tight corset of regulations for temporary work have produced cries of paralysis from Pierre-Ier-de-Serbie Avenue. The personnel managers of some big public enterprises themselves have laid siege to Matignon to get some elbow room in this field. And the administration finally accepted a change in the rules regarding the "starting and ending date" which forced the employer, a priori, to determine the beginning and the end of intermittent job assignments without any possible change. Linking this problem to the more general problem of temporary jobs and especially subcontracting, Mr Pierre Bellon, CNPF vice chairman, on Tuesday predicted that 200,000 jobs would soon disappear in the economy's less favored sectors.

This figure of course has its polemical aspects, as does the fight to the finish which Mr Chotard continues to conduct against the Auroux report which since Wednesday has been translated into bills. But in doing so, the employers were able to put their finger on one of the major dangers springing from the rather seductive government mechanism, that is, the mechanism that strengthens the protection of wage earners who have a job to the point of slowing down the hiring of those who do not.

How far can one go in this direction without harming the economy? For the employers, the limit has already been exceeded; the labor unions, especially the CGT and the CFDT, are those who maintain that there is still elbow room left. As for the administration, it emphasizes the practice of negotiations on all levels to try to get the labor unions to develop a little more in the way of enterprise spirit.

5058

CSO: 3100/316



## NEW COMPENSATION PLAN OUTLINED; COST TO INCREASE 10 BILLION

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 28 Jan 82 pp 38-39

[Article by Alain Pauche and Francois Roche: "Nationalizations: Source of the Money?"]

[Text] To bring up the subject of financing nationalizations, whose cost has risen some 10 billion francs (45 instead of 35) since the Constitutional Council ruled that the indemnification of shareholders was inadequate, is, in fact, to wonder about the ability of the financial market to respond this year and in 1983 to the needs of enterprises and the government.

Insofar as the market (savers) is vigorously courted by the government, which is anxious to cover the budgetary deficit, as the debenture-holding market will be in the future by enterprises in the public sector -- in a better position to have access than those in the private sector -- the question deserves to be asked.

The fact that the cost of paying back shareholders (initially set at 34 billion) now totals, according to the Ministry of Finance, 35 billion francs, to which one must add the 5.2 billion representing the amount of interests paid to holders of debentures and the 5 to 6 billion covering the indemnification of the 21 unlisted banks whose nationalization has been postponed until 1983, cannot be considered as a mishap, even if one estimates that the total capital expense (35 billion, repayable over 15 years) represents only half of the proceeds from the corporate tax in 1981 and one-third of the sum committed several years ago to save the iron and steel industry!

In order to better appreciate the amount which compensation of the shareholders represents, it is necessary to recall the indemnification procedure chosen by the government, which is in charge of the schedule:

The National Industry Fund and the National Banking Fund, set up by the nationalization law, will be in charge of amortizing the debt and paying back the shareholders. They will remit the negotiable debentures, which will then be entered into the official quote and paid back in 15 years by a lottery.

The first reimbursement, which will take place on 1 January 1983, will therefore involve a sum of some 2.3 billion, or 1/15th of the 35 billion. The government will have repaid the capital in 1998.

The expenditures of the two funds will be covered, on the one hand, by government allocations and, on the other hand, by royalties paid by the nationalized enterprises themselves. The government believes that this formula offers a double advantage: 1 -- It makes it possible to reduce the government's direct commitment without overloading the budget; and 2 -- It tends to make administrators of the newly nationalized enterprises responsible, L'USINE NOUVELLE was told by a close aide of Jean Le Garrec, secretary of state in charge of expanding the public sector, "by paying dividends to the nation, in a sense."

#### Domestic Capital Market

It should be added that while the law provides that the two public establishments are empowered to contract for loans, it does not give the key to distribution among these three sources of financing. Likewise, it is an order that will set the amount of the royalties of the industrial enterprises and the banks.

Added to the capital will be the amount of interest paid to those holding debentures. This interest is "equal to the rate of yield of government loans, whose capital or interests are not indexed, issued at a fixed rate for a period of over 7 years." Consequently, on 1 July 1982 and 31 December 1983, according to our estimates, the funds will have to pay out two sums corresponding to the yield of such debentures, equivalent to 15-16 percent (of 35 billion). It is therefore the interest paid to the shareholders that makes up the essential portion of the note.

This further increases the needs for financing of the government and the public sector. Having discarded the option of taxation for the time being, there practically remains only the solution of indebtedness. Can the domestic capital market alone absorb public needs? Is France's foreign debt capacity adequate?

The answer to the first question is rather in the negative. The last government loan, for some 10 billion francs, was more difficult to sell than the others, which demonstrates the domestic market's limited ability to respond.

One must realize that the government remains a heavy borrower on that market. In 1981, some 107 billion francs in bonds were issued in Paris (compared with 111 billion in 1980), including 78 billion by the government and the public sector. In 1982, needs will be greater. The budget deficit will exceed 100 billion francs and national enterprises will resort to borrowing for some 51 billion francs (or over 60 percent of their financing plan).

If one adds to this the funds that will have to be obtained by the National Industry Fund and the National Banking Fund and the loans that will have to be floated by a number of newly nationalized enterprises, it is doubtful whether the capacity of the domestic market alone will be sufficient for two reasons at least: The revival of consumption should result in a relative stabilization of household savings and the government cannot monopolize all the resources of the market, for private enterprises would then be pushed out and they are the ones being asked to invest.

## Foreign Credit

There remains the international capital market. It is difficult to evaluate France's foreign financial situation and its foreign debt capacity precisely. Experts from several banks believe that the outstanding foreign debt is between 130 and 150 billion francs, which is approximately equivalent to our debts. But the quality of the debts is very uneven because over two-thirds involve developing countries. The problem is therefore more in the solvency of our customers rather than the imbalance in our financial situation. France's foreign exchange reserves remain substantial: about 300 billion francs, about 100 billion of which can be rapidly available.

How much further can France go into debt? It is difficult to answer this question precisely because of a lack of official data. At most, one can estimate our additional debt capacity at 100 billion francs. The government can therefore borrow on the international capital market -- and will do so -- and encourage those dependent on it to do as well. Such operations are a good method of supporting the currency, temporarily, at least.

The government should not encounter insurmountable difficulties in financing its own needs and those of the public sector. However, service on the debt must not overburden the government's budget. From this standpoint, the trend is an upward one. Reimbursement of the public debt represented 37.7 billion francs in the initial 1981 Budget. For 1982, the figure goes to 53.6 billion, an increase of over 40 percent. Projections show that the burden of the debt will reach some 200 billion francs by 1985-1986, a far from negligible sum. That is why the government must be cautious and will finance through the issuance of money that which it cannot obtain through borrowing. In both cases, the room to maneuver is limited.

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CSO: 3100/292

## BRIEFS

GREEK-FRENCH TOURISM COOPERATION--A tourist cooperation programme between Greece and France is to be finalised by the end of this year, following a decision taken at talks held in Athens by French Tourist Undersecretary Francois Abadie with National Tourist Organisation (EOT) President K. Kyriazis and Secretary-General S. Panagopoulos, as well as representatives of tourist agencies. The signing of a relevant agreement will be preceded by a study, by both countries, of the various matters to be tackled. The agreement will provide for Greek-French cooperation covering all kinds of tourism, in the organisation of hotel of between 60 and 100 rooms, in the development of spas, in the training of personnel to be employed in hotels and other tourist establishment, etc. The French Undersecretary left for Paris on Sunday following the conclusion of his talks in Athens. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 10 Feb 82 p 9]

CSO: 4600/277

## FAHRI 'REVEALS' WESTERN COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION

Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 4 Dec 81 p 5

[Text] In all its history of relations with the West, Turkey has never been the taker, but always the giver, the loser. The efforts and exertions to Westernize Turkey and to be Western in the last century in particular have made no difference in the status as giver. Indeed, it is this posture that has done so much to increase Turkey's loss.

My tongue is weary from saying it over and over, but weary as it is, I don't think I have yet been able to get my point across to a large segment of society. It's still the same old thing. There are still some circles that keep on about the West, no matter what. They can't take "no" for an answer. But it is not that there haven't been some to profess the truth of what we've been saying all these years, too.

Now I would like to cite verbatim a recent newspaper report. Since this newspaper is known for its pro-Western tendencies, I thought its columns might be convincing. Although this newspaper is taking issue with the West in the report, however, it will not hesitate to be a Western apologist and write again tomorrow or the next day that Turkey's salvation lies in the West. Nevertheless, it is possible to accept this as a confession.

The headlines of the report were: "We Want Commercial Equality, Not Aid, From the West." "If the Common Market gave us the export facilities it gives Greece, or even Korea or Tunisia, our exports would increase and we would have enough foreign exchange income to have no need for credit or aid." The report read, verbatim:

"The imposition of a high 16 percent duty on Turkish cotton thread by the Common Market Commission has revived the issue of 'commercial inequality' between Europe and Turkey. The Common Market, imposing high, arbitrary duties on the products Turkey is able to sell, from tomato sauce to citrus, from olive oil to apples, and thereby largely prohibiting the sale of Turkish products to European countries, seems to be promoting 'obviously unfair trade.'

"In the 20 years since 1960 when we applied for community membership, trade has been consistently unfavorable to us because the Common Market places high customs duties on Turkish products. Common Market nations have sold \$18 billion in goods to Turkey in 20 years, but have bought only \$9 billion worth from us in the same time. They have thus skinned Turkey of \$9 billion in 20 years.

"While such an unfair trade deficit persists, it is being said that the aid and credits supplied Turkey by the West and usually spent to buy goods from them have made no difference. 'Turkey has now reached the point of wanting aid, not fair trade, from the West,' they say.

"Those who contend that Turkey could greatly increase sales if the Western nations did not impose customs duties on Turkey's products in reciprocal dealings say: 'Turkey's exports to Europe would increase if the West granted Turkey the customs facilities it grants Greece. Indeed, it would be sufficient if the Common Market just granted Turkey the export facilities granted Korea, Tunisia and Taiwan.

"In this way, Turkey could get on with its development without falling into bad habits such as depending on Western aid and credits. Therefore, we should expect equal trade instead of aid from the West."

That's the report...the confessions of a Western apologist in short. Those who have been taking exception for years to our appraisals of relations with the West have suddenly, somehow, noticed that something is wrong. Or else recognized the truth. Let us hope so, because it is impossible to know what is right unless one recognizes the truth.

8349

CSO: 4654/94



## FUEL BILLS EXORBITANT WITH WINTER'S ONSET

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 10 Dec 81 pp 1, 13

[Interview with Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Serbulent Bingol by Erkan Yigit, TERCUMAN reporter on economic topics: "Fuel Costs More Than Rent"]

[Text] Ankara -- More suits are being filed in Turkish courts than ever before. While judges struggle to reduce the pile of thousands of cases awaiting decision, new ones are added to it every day. Bailiffs use different terms in summoning plaintiffs and defendants.

These days, the halls of justice often echo to bailiffs' calls of "fuel case" instead of "homicide, witness, assailant." The unceasing troubles of apartment buildings are adding a new dimension in the form of "fuel disputes."

## Interview with Minister

We talked with Energy and Natural Resources Minister Serbulent Bingol about the "apartment dispute," the topic of the "New Clients!" complaints filed in our courts. I put Bingol -- the ultimate authority to which the "new category of litigant in our courts" will have recourse -- in the judgment seat and asked him some questions. The minister plunged in to sort out the "apartment dispute" and, defining the "high cost of fuel oil" as the cause of the dispute, gave the following verdict:

"Fuel oil prices, unfortunately, are something over which we have no command. But I know that fuel oil costs as much as rent, or even more in some buildings."

Energy and Natural Resources Minister Serbulent Bingol can offer no solution but a recommendation to the apartment disputes swelling the number of fuel oil suits and defers to the litigants "to end the apartment disputes and resolve the suits by agreement." Minister Bingol says:

"As the state, we cannot go into someone's home and tell them what kind of fuel to burn. Our citizens must decide this. If they use a stove, can they meet their hot water needs by boiling water on the stove?"

As the minister's hands are tied regarding fuel oil prices, we asked: "At least, what are your recommendations?"

--The first condition is for apartment building residents to find a system that will suit everyone.

--Having a constant supply of hot water on tap is not consistent either with energy conservation or citizens' incomes for today.

--A management plan, or its alteration, on which the majority of residents in a building can agree is a must. According to the apartment building regulations now in effect, if 19 people in a 20-apartment building do not want hot water and one person does, the desires of that one person are carried out."

Intolerable, But...

Energy and Natural Resources Minister Bingol felt complaintants justified who say, "The largest item in the citizen's budget is what he spends for energy. A large part of this goes for heat and hot water," but indicates this approach will not end the apartment dispute. The energy minister says that past mistakes lie at the root of the problem, adding:

"Apartment management plans drawn up years ago under comfortable circumstances are a source of complaint for many citizens today. The selection of fuel type and heating conditions as well as the cost of ready hot water are on a scale that many families cannot afford today. The necessary changes must be made in the apartment plans which are not suitable under present circumstances."

In that the quashing of the minister's verdict by a superior authority is impossible in the "Apartment Dispute" case and since Serbulent Bingol's verdict is that "the cause leading to the dispute and the filing of suits is the cost of fuel which, combined with rent, equals salary," the dispute will not end.

The energy and natural resources minister also lodged his own complaint about the exorbitant cost of winter heating. However, a compromise formula that would get the litigants to call for an end to the dispute comes only as a recommendation, and changing the guidelines lies at the root of that. O managers, o hard-pressed renters and landlords who say, "I will put a 30-percent increase clause in the contract every year. I will look after myself by getting a year's advance and collecting my interest from the brokers," end the dispute now. This dispute will only drag on. Get together and make a decision; at least take the minister's recommendation and agree to put an end to the apartment dispute. Who wants a stove, let him have a stove; who wants a furnace, let him have a furnace. And thus put an end to the apartment dispute and the hundreds of suits on file.

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## NORDIC CONSERVATIVES DISCUSS 'ZONE', POLAND, NATO

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Feb 82 p 7

[Article: "Nuclear Free Zone Still on Ice"]

[Excerpt] There are no prospects at this time for a nuclear-free zone, which was discussed at a meeting of Nordic conservative parties.

Conservative Party Chairman Ilkka Suominen pointed out on Monday that unanimity on a zone is rather far away.

"Finland is not attempting to make its own position uniform with that of the other Nordic countries. We are aspiring to discussions which are based on the security policy premises of each country," states Ilkka Suominen.

The issue came up yesterday when leaders of the Nordic conservative parties met each other in Helsinki.

"We are not pushing a Nordic nuclear-free zone on our friends," stated Suominen upon hearing the cautious attitude of his guests with respect to this plan.

## Submarine Reduced Enthusiasm

Sweden's new Moderate Conservative Party Chairman Ulf Adelsohn recalled the submarine scandal. The Soviet submarine incident off the coast of Sweden cannot help but decrease Sweden's interest in this planned zone, stated Adelsohn.

He referred to the chief goal: making all of Europe a nuclear-free zone.

## NATO Cannot Be Forgotten

Norway's Conservative Chairman, Prime Minister Kare Willoch, for his part, brought up the arms limitations talks of the superpowers in Europe. The Nordic discussion should not precede these efforts.

Willoch stated that Norway cannot bind itself to an agreement which would perhaps not be in accordance with the interests of NATO. According to him actions on the part of the Soviet Union are expected.

Denmark's conservative leader, Poul Schluter, agreed with Willoch. We must await progress in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and not change the balance of the blocs.

#### EDU Against Foreign Policy

Chairman Suominen also explained why Finland abstained from the position of Poland, in which nine EDU-countries issued a tough statement on the Soviet Union's role in the events in Poland,

EDU is a cooperative organization of conservative parties in Western Europe.

"The stand was against Finland's foreign policy since it interfered in the conflicts of the superpowers. However, I do not believe that the unity of the EDU suffered from this," stated Suominen.

The only guest of a ministerial level was Sweden's Ulf Adelsohn: Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen will receive him today. Yesterday Adelsohn met with Naval Commander Jan Klenberg.

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## POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, ARMS OPTIONS FOR SECURITY VIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 21 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by Edouard Balladur, former secretary-general, Elysee Palace: "The Moment of Truth"]

[Text] Western Europe is experiencing a serious and strange crisis: It has the feeling that its security is no longer guaranteed but it refuses to do what must be done to strengthen it. Paradoxically, the American project for installing medium-range nuclear rockets in Europe, the Pershing and Cruise missiles, to counter the installation of the SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union worries Europe: In France's neighboring countries, there is criticism of the installation of weapons that are built to defend us against our possible adversary, rather than protesting against that adversary's arms race.

The Polish crisis tragically shows how Europe depends on the two superpowers, how it is powerless due to a lack of common will and courage rather than due to a lack of means. Here again, as in the affair of the euromissiles, we are surprised by the deliberate blindness of our allies who for a long time stuck to the fiction of dealing here with a Polish domestic affair. West Germany's almost passionate attachment to the policy toward the East can be explained by national interests. But others do not have the same excuse.

France must reconsider the problems of European defense. The moment has come for revitalization.

#### A Turning Point

In spite of the discussions by military specialists who make a distinction among various assumptions, who refine theories, and who invent esoteric vocabularies, like the money specialists, the facts of the problem are posed in simple terms even though the solutions are difficult.

In spite of the growing importance of the countries in the Pacific, world peace depends primarily on the maintenance of the current balance in Europe because this is where the risk of destabilization of the West is currently strongest and this is where the free peoples must prove to be most vigilant. Moreover, this is where France happens to be.

After World War II, Europe's military protection was clearly provided by the United States. America's military and economic preponderance was so strong and America's determination to defend its allies was so obvious that the political and economic price

which it had paid seemed justified. That was at the time of the American doctrine of massive retaliation: Any Soviet aggression against a country of the Atlantic Alliance would trigger an immediate nuclear response against the Soviet Union. The American guarantee seemed unfailing.

The situation has changed gradually. The United States has replaced the theory of massive reprisals with the theory of the flexible response which introduced doubt into the minds of America's allies regarding America's determination to defend them immediately. Then the balance of forces changed: On the strategic level, American and Soviet nuclear forces were balanced out but the Soviets have superiority in Europe for everything else, including conventional weapons, manpower, tactical nuclear forces and European strategic forces.

Europe has reached a turning point on which its entire future may depend. On the one hand, the theory of the flexible response has to a great extent reduced confidence in the Alliance: the European peoples no longer know which of their frontiers will be defended by the Alliance, neither under what assumption, nor with what weapons, nor at what moment, nor on what territory. On the other hand, the unwise statements by American officials on the limited character which a nuclear conflict might assume, in Europe, along with projects for the installation of American euro-missiles in Europe give the pacifist temptation an impetus which France fortunately so far has escaped best of all. The European peoples are wondering whether they will be defended and, at the same time, they are afraid of being defended and seeing their land become a nuclear battlefield.

#### Weak Points

This produces a mortal risk for the solidity of the Alliance, for peace, and consequently for the destiny of France. The first problem that comes up today is a political problem: How to give Europe back confidence in the Alliance, how to give it the desire to defend itself. If we do not achieve that, Europe in the end will have to bow in view of Soviet arms superiority aimed at destroying the adversary's will to defend himself: that is offensive deterrence.

The question facing Germany is this first of all: the ban on nuclear weapons, Soviet pressure against the installation of American missiles, support for West Germany's Eastern policy, the geographic location of the country where it is exposed to first strikes--these today make West Germany the weak link in the West. The question also faces France whose security to a good extent depends on the existence of a Germany determined to defend itself or agreeing to being defended.

It would do no good to approve--as some of our allies are doing--"the zero option": the fact that there are no longer any medium-range American missiles aimed at the USSR from Western Europe would not in any way change the imbalance to the benefit of the Soviets in terms of conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, this zero option is the surest way to dislocate the Alliance's Europe's security rests on the "linkage" between its defense and that of the United States: The United States must feel attacked when Europe is attacked because otherwise there is no longer any Alliance. Now, the presence of American missiles in Europe guarantees that the USSR cannot attack Europe without attacking the American nuclear forces. The zero option would weaken the nuclear bonds between Europe and the United States.



But Europe cannot be content with reacting to the proposals of others, Americans or Soviets. It must prepare its future itself and it must take better care of its own defense for reasons of dignity, independence, and security and to shield itself against the ups and downs of American-Soviet relations.

The analysis of the situation is simple, as demonstrated by the French Institute of International Relations. The Western deployment suffers from two fundamental weaknesses: the growing inferiority of Western conventional forces, the growing incredibility of an American first strike using nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. The remedies are also fundamental in theoretical terms: the Europeans must strengthen their conventional military forces, they must on the other hand obtain major nuclear weapons, and have absolute agreement on their use for first strikes.

As we can see, this above all is a political matter: Do the countries of Europe want to defend themselves together, do they want to acquire the means to do so? Today nothing is more important for France than to see the afterthoughts of its partners clearly. One might also envisage a gathering of the Western European Union consisting especially of France, Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy for the purpose of examining the various means of strengthening European defense. This is not a matter of giving this conference an anti-American appearance but rather of placing the Alliance more solidly on new foundations.

It would be necessary above all on a European scale to set up a specific program for the modernization of the conventional forces: development of cooperation in the matter of arms production, strengthening of bonds between the conventional land, sea, and air forces, which by the way would raise some very complex problems within NATO, specialization of tasks among European armies, since Germany has the strongest conventional army, while France and Great Britain would concentrate their efforts on nuclear armament, cooperation among European conventional forces for the common protection of raw material supply sources.

But the fundamental and urgent problem is the strengthening of Europe's nuclear protection. In this regard, we can visualize three hypotheses with decreasing likelihood.

1. The least difficult would have the West consolidate and revitalize the Atlantic Alliance through an effort in terms of political determination and clarity. This, for example, would presuppose the following:

A European declaration affirming the vital interests of keeping American troops in Europe, the way this was done not long ago by France at Reykjavik. This is one of the ways of making the bond between the defense of Europe and the defense of the United States automatic.

Unreserved approval by the European countries of the installation of Pershing rockets and Cruise missiles in Europe. This is the position which France fortunately adopted several months ago, although its example has not yet been followed.

Strengthening of their defense resources and their military budgets which are obviously too small, where France also for a long time has displayed good will.

An American commitment not to discuss strategic and tactical nuclear problems with the Soviets except with prior agreement by the Europeans. One cannot claim to defend

them without informing them and involving them in the major decisions that above all concern their future and their life,

An American commitment to defend the territory of America's allies at their very borders which presupposes that any doubt must be removed as to the implementation of the theory of the flexible response. If they want to dissipate the neutralist feelings spreading in Europe, the Americans must guarantee that European territory will be defended like their own territory.

2. The second way is more difficult although it is not incompatible with the first one: This would involve instituting real European cooperation in the matter of defense which means that France and Great Britain would pledge to use their nuclear forces to defend the borders of West Germany. If it is possible that the Soviets can doubt the employment, by the United States, of American nuclear weapons for the defense of the continent, the Soviets would no longer have any doubts the moment the Europeans themselves have the capacity and the will to trigger a first strike. This does not mean replacing the American nuclear umbrella with a European umbrella; the objective would not be to replace the American guarantee but to strengthen it.

Such an orientation would create tremendous problems in terms of public opinion and for the various governments involved; it would presuppose that France and Great Britain agree to risk their survival in case Germany is attacked and to undertake the corresponding technical and financial effort and it would presuppose that Germany, for the price of this new guarantee, would agree to boost its conventional military forces. None of this is as yet evident: Would the French agree to widen the coverage of their deterrence to the benefit of their allies? What would be the pattern for nuclear cooperation between France, Germany, and Great Britain? What would be the consequences of the broadening of France's nuclear role in Europe as regards French diplomacy? Is Great Britain ready to embark upon this road to the detriment of its preferred relations with the United States? The difficulties are great but without a European defense as such, there will be no more Europe.

3. A third direction might be more radical, more chimeric, and full of danger: permit Germany's nuclear rearmament. This would be the best way to dissipate the feeling which the Germans have to the effect that they are the plaything of the rivalries of the superpowers, a feeling which leads them to neutralism. Embarking on this road, which would not make European military cooperation any easier, would presuppose that the German population agrees to the idea, something which is less than evident; it would presuppose that West Germany's Eastern policy, inaugurated 10 years ago, would have to be abandoned, it would bring about a major international crisis between the Soviet Union and the Westerners; this would endanger the European equilibrium not only between East and West but also within the West itself.

#### Need for Renewal

Is it possible to advance on the first two roads? This is quite doubtful but France must, without excessive illusions, try to check this idea out, by bringing about a meeting of this European military conference or by any other way. This is in line with France's essential interests: France cannot ignore the profound troubles among neighboring nations, a situation which seriously threatens their defense; the policy of independence within the Alliance, pursued by France for 20 years, includes the protective screen made up of the American military presence on the territory of a West

Germany which actively participates in the common defense. If this protective screen were to become weak, France itself would be weakened. France's first concern must be to restore strength to the German defense determination and to the determination to maintain the American presence without threatening, in ever so minor a way, its own policy of independence.

In case of failure, the status quo within an Alliance racked by doubts, a Europe without a clear vision and without courage, would be inconceivable. Then would come the moment for a profound renewal of French military, political, and diplomatic thinking. If Europe were to let things slide, all we could do would be to move closer to the United States, to strengthen our alliance with the United States, to step up our bilateral military cooperation. That would be possible without risk to our independence and our national nuclear defense on the basis of the situation created by our military and diplomatic effort over the past 20 years. Hence, our political and military relations with the United States could be expressed in new terms. This would not involve recomposing NATO, which we would have to stay away from more than ever before, but it would mean establishing closer relations with the Americans on the bilateral level, as other nations of the world are doing, for instance, Japan.

A new policy for a new time. The policy of France for the past 20 years was based on military independence, on the Atlantic Alliance, on European construction, on peaceful coexistence with the East. The Alliance is tottering, Europe is indecisive, detente currently is meaningless because it was not accompanied by clarity and courage on the part of the West; we must not abandon any of the three in terms of their principles but we must not entertain any illusion as to their current merit. Independence is more necessary than ever before.

The United States is aware of what the position of France represents. It is in France's interest with the United States to spell out new relations based on mutual guarantees and on strengthened military solidarity. If this effort should also fail, then we would have to increase our resources, assert our determination, and convince public opinion that the worst is still possible--but we have to do that anyway, under all assumptions.

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## FLEMISH SOCIAL CHRISTIAN'S SWAELEN ON PARTY'S ROLE

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 20 Jan 82 pp 16-19

[Interview with Frank Swaelen, CVP [Social Christian Party] chairman and candidate: "Write that I am Against the Particracy"; date and place not given]

[Text] In precisely 6 weeks, the CVP must elect its new chairman: Frank Swaelen or Herman Van Rompuy. The first is now already the acting chairman and it appears that the party will want to retain him. For as former deputy chairman, secretary general and minister of defense he was born and bred on Tweekerken Street. Without the untimely departure of the native of Antwerp, Raymond Derinne, even Swaelen's parliamentary career (meanwhile also mayor of Hove) would have begun much later or perhaps not at all.

Moreover his political biography contains two special chapters: the world of education and that of NATO. Both appear rather clearly in the program of the Martens V government: They will be able to decide arbitrarily about the missile problem and finally the CVP has its own minister of education, so long requested.

[Question] Was the CVP right in demanding so insistently the portfolio of education?

[Answer] You naturally have those who say that at education with 80 percent of the budget which is absorbed by bargaining, still no policy is made and that culture is more interesting. And although it really always is a tricky choice, I think education is more important at the moment. Why?

Because there are a number of absorbing problems to solve there. Because the CVP can show eminently with that portfolio that is really a national party and not an interest party. If you ask me whether national education now is in good hands with us, not developed and so on, then I answer yes. The others have denied us the portfolio for years on the basis of a certain role model. They succeeded in pushing us back into the role of exclusive defender of Catholic



education. Consequently we are that also, but not exclusively. However, we have never been allowed to show we were not only that. In the school agreement committee, I often have had enough to do with colleagues from other parties, who always wanted to do it on the cheap. Like: I now want this or that for national education, what do you want for independent education? In addition, those people themselves never had any interest in the legitimate aspirations of independent education, while they never assumed the least interest on our part in national education. We now have the chance to break through that. An important assignment is to guarantee the continuity of policy in national education. It has suffered too much from improvisations. You cannot change course over 180 degrees in 5 years without not only affecting the motivation of the teaching staff, and the appeal to the students, but also quality itself.

[Question] Still the competition between the two school systems is a fact, certainly the number of students is now declining. No individual minister can be neutral in that contest.

[Answer] But not only the systems are now in mutual competition, but even the schools themselves. The Christian schools together and the national schools with each other. The school communities are meanwhile a means to block that competition over a whole area. However, at its educational conference last spring in Zwevegem the CVP declared that competition between schools may only take place on the level of quality and that consequently every discrimination must be eliminated.

[Question] A country like Belgium soon will have nothing else to offer the world but the competency of its people. Is it really desirable to skimp on education. With 80 percent of the expenditures for salaries, can we save only by increasing the number of pupils per class, so that there is less good education.

[Answer] That is an unproven axiom. We now have the most favorable standards in Europe, but it has by no means been proven that worse education would be provided elsewhere than with us. On the level of standards there is no doubt an optimum ratio, but it is not a fact that it improves by always making restrictions. Economy does not necessarily mean reduction of quality. Priorities must simply be set, with which there must be a creative reaction to new circumstances. If we do not save now, even not on education, all sectors of national life are going to the dogs, even education. Moreover, there are enough peripheral areas there, where savings can be begun. You can never tell me that for the present volume of the education budget, we get back just as much quality. But I recognize that genuine savings are only possible in the future, through rationalization and programming. But if we now, for example, can actually achieve a coordination of standards in Flanders and Wallonia, several billions will be saved. Let us consider, in addition, the higher educational



sector. There we have not only the fact of the large number of campuses, but also somewhat dual use. We pay 3 and 4 times for the same specialities, which really are not well utilized. One faculty for all Flanders can, in some cases, suffice. But on that level, initiatives are already coming from the Flemish rectors themselves. It now appears that we need training in library science at a university level, but one of our existing universities can handle that completely. That also must be possible in conventional faculties. It is really not necessary here to have eight places, at the same time, for two students to be taught some Chinese on a high level.

[Question] Outside your customary expertise in the sphere of education, you have now been a member of the foreign affairs committee for many years and you were minister of defense for a good year. A sort of self-evident blood brotherhood with the United States is considered inevitable for a Belgian politician in such a position. Has that ever been an obstacle for you to achieve an objective policy?

[Answer] That affinity naturally exists, but the question is whether it is so wrong. We naturally have sympathy because of the Atlantic Alliance and because of the events in the recent past in this century. On the other hand, I can say certain things to the American ambassador, which they immediately would be mad about in Washington, precisely because I am a friend, above suspicion. For example, I do not need to mince matters about American policy in Latin America.

[Question] Usually the CVP cannot conscientiously allow 300 priests to protest against it, as we have experienced in the sensitive weeks before the elections, in connection with positions about Latin America. Your deputy chairman then said that the party had made a mistake. Does Chairman Swaelen want to avoid such things?

[Answer] We estimated that rather poorly, making a mistake is somewhat different. I will not even offer as an excuse that we reportedly handled that matter badly, because that would give the impression that we still were right, but had only misinterpreted things. But in connection with El Salvador, I am convinced that the Flemish Christian Democrat's position is correct and right, that the only solution for it is in free elections under international guarantees and controls. However, what is beyond dispute is that we have not listened enough in the past to people who were just as concerned as we ourselves, but whom we do not meet immediately at every corner of Wet Street. For me, their idealism is above suspicion. Perhaps we gave too little attention to the points of view which they expressed on their local level and in their groups and movements. I have no doubt that the channels of communications with those people were blocked.

[Question] Is that not precisely your basic schizophrenia, that on one hand, you must live with your great affection for the alliance and

on the other hand, with the chaplains and idealistic workers in your christian rank and file. When do you see your ethical moment come, when the Flemish CVP must say to the American ally: we go so far with you, but no further. As christian people, we can no longer countenance the suffering which you are causing, for christian democrats you have now entered the camp of the criminals?

[Answer] Because I understand the U. S. position and value their alliance, I do not, therefore, endorse their policy throughout the world. The CVP's assignment is that they again must listen to a large number of people whom they perhaps did not listen to enough in recent years. Now we must find the means, without the opposition treatment which was not allowed us, to still work for renewal and revitalization. In other circumstances, after a defeat like ours on 8 November, a party would have won the opportunity to purge itself in a few years, far from the exercise of power. However, we were not allowed that. Since the liberation, we have not often won the opportunity, in practice, to join the opposition. Even now, when a mathematical majority exists against us, the others have not wanted to use it. Even they who had kicked so hard against us, that our CVP state was finished, have not wanted to give the alternative any chance. Still a party continually needs renewal. But as we are now not allowed revitalization by the opposition, we must find other means and mechanisms to better associate with what cannot exist on our terms. That is an assignment. As regards peace and the missiles and the like, it is not so that a unanimous rank and file would not have reached an agreement with a party leadership, which arrogantly would not have taken them into account. The problem is that we must give a lot of people, who share a different and original opinion, an opportunity, more than in the past, to present their point of view to us in a valid manner.

[Question] In the past the CVP appeared hardly able to reach a definite point of view, of so it is and not otherwise, on questions of life and death. But if you cannot reach any joint opinion about a question such as the missiles, about what then can you? With freezing and thawing, with giving and taking, you are not a movement.

[Answer] The essential factor of a movement is precisely diversity. That is so in the CVP, but not only in the CVP. That is true for all modern political parties. They are not divided, but certainly different internally. That is so because the problems are not simple and because a solution is not obvious.

Take a position just once, minister of foreign affairs, with such a party behind you. That is not only difficult for your ministers, but for everyone. There is talk about neutron bombs, act there just once as a CVP member. What does your party advocate?

[Answer] I do not deny that a party must make decisions, but not on the basis of a consistent opinion. I will now attempt to find ways and means in the party to democratically develop definite ideas about a decision. Therefore it is not always necessary to strive for a sweeping consensus, as that does not exist, but making a decision in which the majority has a proposal and a vision, which the minority acquiesces in. Moreover, that is taking place precisely so in the country as a whole, that is only reflected in us. That is so because we are the genuine mainstream in Flemish public opinion.

[Question] But 7 out of 10 Flemings voted against the CVP.

[Answer] But the previous time we had many more and the next time we will have that again. What I say is that the christian democrats remain the mainstream, regardless of the CVP election results. It is not precisely that we are a class party, we may not be that. What we certainly are is the natural defender of a number of social movements and organizations which live around us and have privileged ties with us. Our destiny is that we must effect a combination there, but the CVP is always more than the mere sum of its parts.

[Question] Some parts still get exceptionally little chance, or only very precariously. From your party and the circles around it, there now comes strikingly little talk about handling of the steel problem. which is still very mild and flexible, from the Flemish point of view.

[Answer] That then is especially involved with what we have gone through in the previous cabinet. The lack of talk is the respect shown the new government. It became namely a trauma to us, that daily inertia and that uncontrollability. A skeleton cabinet had to meet again every day, you had new pressure and blackmail every day.

[Question] But now all is conceded in advance. Where is Jos Dupre, what has become of all the gospel of the so-called historic congress of 16 December 1979? Is this now CVP policy? Or is the CVP suddenly renouncing its most sacred principles as Jean Gal has just asked?

[Answer] It is not true that the Flemings are conceding everything all at once. We previously had prescribed conditions, which are being met. The only new development is that the matter is now released, because a new atmosphere of goodwill prevails. That had not been possible under the previous cabinet, because you were involved with such a dull participacy. The Walloon socialists never could decide something on Friday, without first getting their party's instructions. I am against that. Write that the acting CVP chairman is against participacy, against parties which concern themselves with matters which are the responsibility of the government.

[Question] In the sort of confession of faith which you made last week as candidate for continuing as your party's chairman, you write about "bad habits." Do you mean by that the three stage missile, the lack of CVP discipline, which will have been a characteristic of the Tindemans period? On Friday morning we had a cabinet council in which the CVP ministers, pledged themselves to a budget, or whatever. On Monday, that was then approved yes or no by your party executive committee, mostly no. Your own minister of finances then was allowed to happily shoot holes in his budget. Then we found your parliamentary groups, which still had to operate somewhat on the parliamentary level of the coalition. You frequently had the fourth stage of Eric Van Rompuy or Miet Smet. Everyone concerned themselves with everything, but who was the CVP now? Spitaels said we are dizzy from that. It certainly cannot be wrong for a party to at least have a consistent doctrine.

[Answer] I do not agree with a simple interpretation of the situation. Parties must govern the country. Essentially that is true. They are movements or at least electoral associations which introduce people and ideas, which develop a vision beyond governments where the majority can find itself. But such a movement has its own existence, beyond cabinets and coalitions. The parties even seem to me vital for the unity and continuity of the state organization, like their programs continue to apply beyond the vicissitudes of the years. However, a government is the country's executive committee from day to day. It is responsible for the steel, state reform and what have you, the cabinet must decide. It is deplorable if a party makes decisions instead of its ministers.

[Question] Consequently may we expect that the Monday CVP Executive Committee under Chairman Swaelen no longer will definitely destroy the work of its ministers on Friday?

[Answer] If possible, yes. Mind you the media made the wrong interpretation. If I will then say it only to ask the ministers, do not reproach me then when the CVP again provides no answer.

[Question] In your text, the serious term of spiritual values again appears. Is it perhaps not better that our political parties should not concern themselves too much with that. Is it not better for politics to refrain from discussing some aspects of life, such as whether you must live 5 or 10 years apart to separate and whether you can get rid of a child?

[Answer] I am also of the opinion that politics must not create people's happiness for them or must force their values on them. But then to limit itself, at the same time, purely to management, is also no politics to me. If we should limit ourselves to budgets, streets, trash collection, residential areas or even the chandeliers in our



theatres, I fear that, like in the Scandinavian countries, we would experience an aversion among the people for our message. I am really convinced that we must offer a political promise. You must know in what framework you offer those services, why some priorities are set. You still cannot create a number of material services in a social security system, without a scale of values, without an idea of what you have in mind with them for society. Politics is a social idea which is still somewhat more than the total revenues. You are, for example, going to centralize, or assume that people manage their affairs better on the lower levels. However, that is still an option. But naturally that political perspective stops somewhere. Thus we think, for example, that the state does not need to include any ideology in its education.

Question In recent years we have heard our party chairmen continually make rhetorical speeches about discount rates and employment percentages, it all became an economic speech. Do you support that?

Answer That has even gone so far, that when the need was discussed of cutting back family funds, as an economic measure, for industry, there were people among us who frowned. What would the party of the family now speak up for the factories? But the fact is precisely that we are not a party of economists and that the final goal of the CVP is not to concern itself with the economy. What this government does now, however, it must do well. This program is not for us such an intrinsic priority, as a priority in time. We live in a state of war against our industrial decline, a program of economic restoration must be carried out. But if we again only enjoy prosperity and employment, genuine policy now develops for us. That is the establishment of a just society in which whoever is excluded, gets a fair chance to come in.

Question But are you not then moving rapidly towards uncertainty, towards summer, when there will be even more difficult budget figures? This government's program is not Wilfred Martens', that is now the general feeling.

Answer The politician Martens is now especially appreciated by friend and opponent for the work of large scale state reorganization. However, it would be a great mistake not to take him just as seriously with the program he now proposes. It has almost been a mistake for some not to believe him in his emergency plan in the last days of March. He stood there involved in heart and soul, he has suffered the consequences. However, that plan was not something that he had let the technocrats of the National Bank impose on him.

Question But Martens V has not used that emergency plan for a long time. That plan was his proposal for basic intervention, aimed at



his natural allies, the socialists. That was a proposal to comrades together, to a homogeneous emotional and intellectual circle. But now we are looking at something different, this is already another political career.

[Answer] Precisely that began on 30 March. His conviction had increased then that he could not go any further with the socialists, that continuing priorities with them was no longer possible. Consequently I certainly believe in this Martens. I do not want to swear on the last 10 billion, but the operation must be carried out and certainly by this team. It must and will succeed, that is the very voluntarism which we are neglecting. Our ships are burned, the CVP's entire credibility stands or falls on the government program. Besides Wilfred Martens, two other of our former prime ministers are on the team, supplemented with still other strong personalities. We have nothing more behind us, we do not have any other prime minister up our sleeve.

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CS0: 3105/97

## SCHMIDT DRUMS UP SUPPORT FOR INF BEFORE SPD CONGRESS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Feb 82 pp 19-20

[Article: "Around Three Corners"]

[Text] Using complicated compromise formulas, the SPD leadership will try to avoid a showdown over a moratorium on medium-range missiles at the Munich party congress.

Helmut Schmidt, who is not as a rule very sensitive to his SPD's desires and troubles, is once again fighting for understanding by the rank and file.

The head of the government and Deputy SPD Chairman has for several weeks been traveling through the party districts as a defender of his own cause. Last Saturday he invited himself for a visit with the East Westphalia-Lippe delegation in Paderborn; prior to that, he had been a guest on the Lower Rhine and in Franconia.

The chancellor is trying, in good time before the Munich national SPD party congress, once again to commit the balky SPD to his security and defense policies.

This pressure is urgently needed. In assessing the current mood, former Young Socialists chairman Gerhard Schroeder feels that if the Social Democrats could make an independent decision, they would "immediately cancel the NATO twin resolution with an 80 to 20 majority."

It is unfathomable whether or not Schmidt will be successful in reversing this trend. On his visits, the chancellor does little to assuage the comrades' reluctance: in the words of one of his advisers, he does not face the party like a "suitor who woos and caresses," as the rank and file would prefer. Instead, he lectures on strategy and equilibrium and finishes with a strong injunction against "endless nagging" and against writing stupidities into the proposals.

His lectures are only moderately successful. While on occasion Schmidt manages to deter the delegates from bailing out of the NATO decision, as he did in Franconia, at other times the brethren, as they did in Essen, kick him in the rear. Schmidt had barely taken his leave from a standing ovation when a bare majority of the party congress squeezed through a moratorium resolution intended to forbid "the positioning of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe and

the stationing of additional SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe while negotiations are in progress."

Such a deployment freeze, as the Soviets have offered on several occasions during the past year, was advocated at regional party conferences by about half of the 22 SPD district and Land organizations--among them such loyal branches as Pfalz and Lower Rhine on whose devotion the chancellor had been able to count until then.

The demand for an immediate moratorium is an expression of the deep mistrust with which the SPD follows the Geneva talks. Many party comrades fear that, using the negotiations as a blind, the Americans could create conditions which would make the stationing of new nuclear arms on German soil inevitable in late 1983. The fear of an irreversible process without escape for the FRG motives the Social Democrats already at this time to erect obstacles so as to avoid deployment as long as possible. Schmidt knows what awaits him in Munich. True, the hard core of enemies of counterarming--those who irrespective of the outcome of the Geneva talks want to cancel the twin resolution right now--amounts to perhaps 20 percent of the delegates, according to the party leadership's calculations.

But the critics are ready for an alternative battle. Schmidt's "close enemy" Eppler for instance slyly admitted to a "certain amount of understanding" for the SPD leadership's proposal to postpone the final decision until 1983. He too does not want to be accused of sabotaging the Geneva talks.

But at the same time he is trying to nullify the twin resolution by way of a moratorium: such a vote would be interpreted by the East as well as by the West as a secret retreat on the part of the Germans.

In view of the series of party meetings which have been adverse for him, Schmidt is worried about his international reputation. "In the meantime," the chancellor grumbled, "every district party congress is being analyzed in Washington and Paris."

Schmidt appears determined once again to use every means at his disposal to keep the party from falling from grace. He wants to make it quite clear that if the delegates should fail to toe the line, their decision will determine the SPD's future ability to govern.

SPD Business Manager Peter Glotz hopes that things will not go that far. In his opinion, delegates act quite differently at district party congresses than they do at national party congresses.

SPD headquarters prognosticates that the moratorium will be defeated by 60 against 40 votes. Should this come true, it would constitute a bare and certainly not a brilliant success for Schmidt.

Egon Bahr, a disarmament advocate in the counterarming debate who enjoys particular credibility among his comrades, wants to impress one particular argument upon the delegates: the SPD must not arrive at any decisions which the United States could consider to be a partial cause for a possible failure of the Geneva talks. The reason: Washington's only trump card for putting pressure on the Soviets is the Europeans' readiness for deploying the new U.S. missiles.

Party chief Willy Brandt is of the same opinion: the SPD, he reasons, whose chancellor was second to none in urging the initiation of the Geneva dialogue, must not give the impression that he thinks that the talks are doomed a priori. If he did, this would of necessity kill the FRG Government's chances of conducting a limited independent foreign policy between East and West--as well as Helmut Schmidt's chancellorship.

To obviate the showdown desired by Eppler, the SPD leadership is preparing for making certain compromises. The party congress could for instance prepare a wish list for Geneva which would ask for a moratorium as an intermediate result.

The chancellor would agree to this under the following conditions: the moratorium would have to have a time limit (perhaps 1984 or 1985); in return for NATO's temporary renunciation of weapons deployment, the Soviets would have to agree to remove a certain number of their SS-20's aimed at Western Europe.

Saarbruecken's Mayor Oskar Lafontaine, the SPD's second strongest enemy of counterarming apart from Eppler, has similar thoughts. At a meeting in Frankfurt on Ash Wednesday, he plans to recruit left-wing representatives from all districts for his moratorium plan. It provides for the Soviets to reduce the number of their warheads in the medium range zone to the 1978 level; in response, the Americans should not only discontinue counterarming in Western Europe, but also immediately stop their plans for deploying 2,500 cruise missiles on the coast.

Should Schmidt agree with these artful but noncommittal demands, the leftwingers would keep quiet when the FRG Government starts building emplacements and launching ramps for cruise missiles and Pershing 2's next year.

When thinking about the complicated rationales to be thrown at the delegates in Munich, Rhineland-Palatinate SPD chief Hugo Brandt does not dare to make any predictions: "The moratorium is so tempting for so many because of its simplicity. On the other hand, anyone going along with Schmidt and Bahr has to think around at least three corners."

9273

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## SIGNIFICANCE OF 1982 LANDTAG ELECTIONS WEIGHED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 82 p 8

[An analysis by Helmut Herles]

[Text] Bonn, January--The four Landtag elections scheduled for this year--21 March in Lower Saxony, 6 June in Hamburg, 26 September in Hesse, and 10 October in Bavaria--are being regarded by the headquarters of the Bonn parties (the governing parties and the CDU/CSU opposition) as a political test for preservation of power or for gaining power. Nobody is saying it is "just" a matter of Landtag elections. For that the impact of the Laender on federal politics, through the Bundesrat, is too important and too many voters are being summoned to the polling booths, in fact, almost half the qualified voters of the Federal Republic.

For the Bonn SPD everything hinges on its capacity to govern; on the questions whether its decline in the former municipal strongholds will be arrested; whether it can amortize its deficit in the south at least by some decimal points; whether it can recover its identity as the party of the workers in the industrial age; or whether it will become so Janus-headed with its courting of voters leaning toward all possible varieties of alternatives, the Greens and the peace and youth movements, that neither its current voters nor its potential new voters can recognize it. The Bonn party leaders of the SPD, FDP, and CDU are confronted by similar problems, they don't quite know how to address the "Green" or "lternative" putative voter potential identified by public opinion pulse taking. For informed sources in Bonn believe that is the unknown which could upset all calculations.

The FDP, always wandering close to the parliamentary abyss of the 5-percent clause, is especially affected by this situation. For that reason it is almost like the self-reassurance of a child whistling in the cellar when the FDP chairman Genscher tries to instill fighting spirit in his party for the four Landtag elections by saying it should break the absolute majority wherever it encounters it. In reality the situation of the FDP in the four Landtag elections is probably such that it should be happy if it can remain in the Landtags or--in the case of Hamburg and Lower Saxony--return to them.

There and in North Rhine-Westphalia it is already an "extraparlimentary" party. It will not break the absolute majority of the CSU in Bavaria. It is more likely that it could succeed in Hamburg with the SPD, in that case perhaps in completion with the "Greens". In Lower Saxony, its party congress resolution to enter the



election campaign without a clear statement on coalition annoyed its Bonn leaders, something which certainly "is to be corrected" in the course of the campaign by going after the absolute CDU majority and thereby opening up the possibility of a coalition with the CDU. In Hesse the last example of a coalition along the lines of the Bonn government is, after all, at stake. If Dregger's fourth attempt at taking over responsibility for government in Hesse were to succeed, only the SPD/FDP coalition in Bonn would remain and then probably it would not last much longer. To do it Dregger would have no need to bring up the issue of the two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat which would result (lessened, of course, by the FDP participation in the Saar government) and which could then no longer be overridden by the Bundestag. The deputy federal chairman of the CDU does not plan to do this in any case, mainly because the Laender led by the Union would not or could not make the Bundesrat into that ominous guillotine for the Schmidt-Genscher regime, what with their special governing mentality, their own interests and their relationship to the federal regime. But the psychological effects of further SPD and FDP defeats in the Laender could hardly be kept outside the boundaries of the Bonn coalition. Because of these elections the FDP will, after all, probably be tied to the SPD in Bonn until the end of the legislative period. For an FDP "stampede" to the Union caused by the possibility of electoral defeats would come too late and would take away their credibility with the electors once and for all. The old reputation as a swing or opportunistic party would soon come back to life. Although the FDP now claims that it had spoken last summer of a turning point in this sense, it has missed this turning point.

But for the Union parties as well, these Landtag elections are of national political importance. In this connection it is not only a matter of strengthening their majority in the Bundesrat, but also of testing politicians who have already been or wanted to become candidates for chancellor such as Strauss and Albrecht, but also of the first electoral campaign "on his own account" of their top Hamburg candidate Kiep, who of course has troubles on account of the contributions affair of the parties. But even so Kiep remains so attractive for the middle-class liberal public of Hamburg as an opponent of the "master-type" who is not unlike him, von Dohnanyi, the head of the Hamburg SPD, that the FDP fears for its existence not least because of this competition.

Alfred Dregger would, of course, remain in Hesse where he has reached his life goal, the more so because his political achievement in the politics of the Laender is in any case without example in the Federal Republic. Under his leadership a 20-percent party became the strongest faction in the Hesse Landtag and an absolute majority for the party has become a concrete utopia.

The four-party system organized into three factions in Bonn is at stake this year. If the FDP goes under or if the capacity of the large parties to govern is paralyzed by the entry of the protest party into the Land parliaments, new trends toward "grand" coalitions between the two larger parties, the SPD and the CDU, might appear or solutions based on the Berlin example attempted, creation, that is, of a working majority by means of an unofficial coalition. All of this would on the other hand have repercussions on the Bonn scene which makes it understandable that with the exception of the federal chancellor who does not wish to sacrifice his prestige in the Landtag elections, the leading politicians regard these Landtag election campaigns as their election campaigns. This, of course, in no way serves the importance of Land politics in itself but, on the contrary, threatens to turn the Landtag elections totally into a federal election test.

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## GOALS, NATURE OF GREENS EXAMINED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 82 p 8

[An Analysis by Fritz Ullrich Fack]

[Text] They force the mayor of Darmstadt, an SPD man who is politically dependent on them, to suffer the mockery of the citizenry by carrying out his official duties on a bicycle unless it's raining cats and dogs. They appear at the opening of the Frankfurt municipal council with garish make-up and gasmasks. Not infrequently they vote down their own proposals in the local parliaments without apparent reason. They avoid coalitions with the established parties and still occasionally join them. But then such ties are of short duration--as most recently demonstrated again in Marburg; for even though they do actually sit in the municipal councils their real element is the street, the protest, the extraparliamentary action. The mandate-holder has to participate since his support depends on it. I'm talking about the Greens and the Alternatives.

Next to the ecology, radical pacifism is their main concern. The Greens want the Federal Republic to disarm, by degrees if necessary, but also unilaterally if there is no other way. Why the Bundeswehr should not be immediately and totally dismantled is not ascertainable since, in case of defense it should not be engaged --according to a majority resolution at the most recent quasi-party congress of the Greens in Offenbach--because "a military defense is impossible under the conditions prevailing in the nuclear age." "Social defense" is proclaimed instead, and according to their own statements they are currently studying the case of Poland to see how effective that can be--without, of course, the emergency of a Soviet occupation.

Otherwise "the struggle is directed against this state" (according to co-chairman Petra Kelly), and among the three parties in the Bundestag, the Greens' love-hate is directed in particular at the SPD, by turns the "most mendacious party" or the "east evil."

Who belongs to this political grouping which considers itself the existential and political "alternative" of the republic, and what concepts are to be found among them? The voter potential of the Greens and Alternatives has been estimated at 15 percent and more, a greatly exaggerated number since by application of the same criteria (political groups ranked according to sympathy in first or second place) the FDP would have a potential of 31 percent. This shows how inflated such numbers are as used, for example, by SPD party secretary Glotz in the train of

Brandt's integration policy. In fact, "if Bundestag elections were held next Sunday," 5.7 percent would currently vote for the Greens.

In this party which really does not want to be one and whose party congress is accordingly called a "delegate assembly," the base democratic-pacifist groups set the tone. But a "left-radical" wing with DKP proclivities plays an important role. In addition there is another "right" minority which has sprung up especially in Bremen which is regarded in its own ranks with the highest degree of mistrust. Though Green and biologically orthodox politically they are an association of deviationists. For example they reproach the SPD for its "downright cultivation of extremely radical anarchists," criticize the high national debt, find the nuclear power theme worn out and fight against the creation of slums by the influx of foreigners into urban areas. When it comes to concrete and trees they return to the standard line.

But this is certainly more of a local aberration and in any case, in the eyes of the majority, part of the process of getting established. The average follower of the Greens has a profile which--according to the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research--clearly sets it apart from the rest of the population. The age group from 16 to 25 is socio-demographically strongly over-represented in the electorate (59 percent of the followers as compared to 26 percent in the population as a whole). People with a secondary school education are also over-represented (56 percent to 39 percent) and those who do not belong to any church (17 percent to 9 percent) while in terms of occupation the Greens are not significantly different from the cross-section of the population.

Differences in their attitudes toward political questions of the day are becoming clearer. Anti-Americanism and a tendency toward neutralism and pacifism as well as a rejection of all defense efforts, especially the modernization of nuclear armaments, are pronounced.

Antipathy for "NATO," "fatherland," "free democratic order" of "USA" is, contrary to the population as a whole, strongly pronounced. Only 24 percent of the Greens believe that "all in all NATO brings more advantages than disadvantages" to the West Germans, as compared to 55 percent of the population as a whole. The pronounced neutralism is borne by the conviction that the East is not militarily stronger than the West; "the East is stronger" say 26 percent of the Greens, but 46 percent of the population.

Similar ideas are found again and again. In answer to the question whether, in the event of a military attack, the freedom of Western Europe should "be defended with all available means" or whether war (which could also be a nuclear war) should be avoided even though one would be forced to live under a communist regime as a result (symbol of the politics of the day: better red than dead), 67 percent of the Greens answered "avoid war at any cost." It is true that in the population as a whole as many as 48 percent (May 1981) take the same position, among these 52 percent of the SPD supporters, 55 percent of the FDP supporters, and 40 percent of the Union supporters. But with the Greens it is two-thirds.

For the establishment of a block in Europe instead of close military collaboration with the United States 69 percent of the Greens are in favor but only 32 percent of the cross-section of the population. The opinion gap on the question whether

the NATO double resolution "is, all in all, good or not" is still greater: 22 percent of the Greens are in favor, 59 percent against, in the population as a whole 52 percent are in favor, 20 percent against (remainder undecided at this time). Here agreement and rejection between the Greens and Alternatives and the population cross-section are nearly reversed.

Completely divergent sets of values emerge for key words such as sexual freedom, technical progress, authority or attitude towards work. For example, in answer to the question, "Would you welcome it if work were less important in life?" 64 percent of the followers of the Greens answered "yes," only 37 percent of the remainder of the population. If sympathy or antipathy for certain key words is asked, positive replies in the population as a whole (with the Greens in parentheses) are given for fatherland with 75 percent (26 percent), progress with 81 percent (55 percent), free democratic order with 78 percent (60 percent) and nation of law with 66 percent (47 percent), while the proportions for the key word "alternative life" are reversed with 42 percent (84 percent).

These numbers document not only the mental distance between the overwhelming majority of the population and the "Greens" but also the sect-like character and the determination of this minority to be different. On the one hand the divergent modes of behavior, the clowning and unpredictability thrive in this soil as do, on the other hand, the fanaticism and the solidarity against the "outside" despite occasional contradictions within the group. There is, of course, also the unrealistic Green who, in a country 30 percent of whose surface is devoted to forest, weeps for every felled tree and appears more tearful than militant--and many see in him purely and simply the type of the "Green."

This is false, for reality has a different face. It is certainly not only the professional rabble-rousers who demonstrate and engage in acts of violence at construction sites of nuclear power plants, runways and garbage dumps. The greens harbor in their ranks a pronounced potential for violence as well. To the question whether one would be in favor of demonstrating against a nuclear power plant "even though radical groups were participating," or whether one would be opposed in principle, 77 percent of the Greens answered "in favor"; only 12 percent were against.

The response of the cross-section of the population to this question is quite different: only 23 percent express themselves in favor of this at least potentially violent form of "demonstration," while nearly 50 percent reject it as a matter of principle. The sectarians are not so peaceful as their parliamentary appearances with their clowning suggest. The attitude towards violence may be split but all too often it has been demonstrated that opposition to it is merely lip service.

9827

CS0: 3103/239

## SAARINEN, SINISALO MAY LOSE POSTS WITHOUT HEALING CP RIFT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 9 Feb 82 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson]

[Text] As expected, the Communist Party did not split at the central committee meeting this past weekend, but the problem was postponed. The extra party congress may mean personnel changes, but in matters of substance its primary goal probably will be to achieve formulas that enable the various groupings to coexist without a party split, Jan-Magnus Jansson writes.

As expected (see editorial, 2 Feb 1982), the Communist Party did not split at the anxiously awaited central committee meeting this past weekend. Both hesitancy among the members before such a decisive step and consideration of international reaction, especially the position of the Soviet party, put a damper on the meeting.

Thus, the meeting delayed both the problems and their solutions. The "administrative" sanctions feared by the minority, which could have led to a purge of the ruling politburo, were totally absent. The wishes of the majority were satisfied, however, in that an extra party congress will convene in May. The decision on this question was formally unanimous.

If for no other reason, the congress must convene because the prescribed number of district organizations, at least six, had called for it. But the time between now and the congress will give the leadership a certain respite to find, if not solutions, at least formulas making possible the continued existence of the party without the feared split.

The central committee meeting was characterized by the same division that was evident in the regular party congress last year. On one side were the "national communists," primarily from the northern districts, i.e. those who want to "clean house." On the other side was the "minority of the majority," which included party leader Aarne Saarinen and the rest of the



party minority. It is leaning toward the status quo, while at the same time Saarinen's group understands that something must be done to guarantee a united front for the party in the future.

Aarne Saarinen's grip on events seems to be extremely weak and it is wholly possible that he may resign from the party leadership in May. It is possible that he may take Taisto Sinisalo with him. That could mean that the younger generation that takes over may tackle more energetically the problem of holding the party together, but it is just as possible that they will inherit the disputes and continue, or perhaps even intensify them. Within the Communist Party, however, there are differences of opinion on issues of substance and not simply personality conflicts.

The possibilities of a real solution to the dispute seem to be slight, since both sides shy away from measures that could result in two communist parties. Even solving the so-called newspaper issue, i.e. primarily the status of Tiedonantaja, presents almost insurmountable difficulties. Arvo Aalto promises optimistically that the congress will result in a "better," meaning more united and orthodox, Communist Party. In practice, the results probably will be new formulas for reconciliation and a new modus vivendi, a way of living together despite disunity.

9336  
CSO: 3109/104

## MAX JAKOBSON: ELECTION FIRMED COUNTRY'S POSITION

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 9 Feb 82 p 7

[Article: "Election Strengthened Country's Position"]

[Text] Finland's international position was strengthened as a result of the presidential election. The credibility of Finland's neutrality also has increased. This was stated by executive vice-president Max Jakobson of the Industry and Commerce Delegation in a speech in Tammerfors on Monday.

Commentaries in the international press also indicate that Finland's position was improved, Jakobsen said.

His analysis of the situation was that Finland strengthened its position towards the West, but this in no way weakened relations with the East.

"On the contrary, I believe the foundation for cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union was strengthened in that the mistrust directed toward the Soviet Union's intentions with respect to the presidential election has proven to be unfounded," Jakobson said.

According to Jakobson, this may be of even greater significance in Europe as proof that cooperation with the Soviet Union does not limit the independence of a small nation.

With regard to domestic politics, he believes that the electoral college accelerated the development of a "Scandinavian party structure," which would mean that the People's Democratic League was losing ground to the Social Democrats.

Jakobson also believes it could be difficult to retain the nonsocialist majority in parliament. This could occur only if it is possible to prevent a split of the nonsocialist vote.

Jakobson believes that the Conservative Party's chances of increasing its influence within the nonsocialist block are increasing, but he does not believe this will cause a decline in the Center Party.

The Center Party received more votes than in previous elections and it may receive the support of voters who previously voted for smaller nonsocialist parties, Jakobson pointer out.

According to Jakobson, the Social Democratic Party's hegemony is limited because it has used up its ideological potential and become conservative.

9336

CSO: 3109/104

## COMMUNISTS CALL SPECIAL CONGRESS IN MAY TO RESOLVE DISPUTE

## Effort To Prevent Party Splitting

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Feb 82 p 6

[Article: "Saarinen Still Demanded Moderation"]

[Text] On Saturday Communist Party Chairman Aarne Saarinen once again made an appeal for patience and moderation in order to prevent a split in the Communist Party. Saarinen spoke in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Central Committee, which will resolve the party's fateful questions in Helsinki over the weekend.

Saarinen emphasized that even though there is no longer any return to the unity of 15 years ago, it is still possible to achieve a tolerable unity.

Saarinen spoke not only in his own voice, but in the voice of Vice Chairman Taisto Sinisalo. Sinisalo had already approved the content of Saarinen's speech.

Saarinen's speech also conveyed the understanding prevailing in the Soviet Communist Party. A letter sent by the Soviet Communist Party, in which hope was expressed that the SKP can retain its unity, was read in the Central Committee. The prevention of a split in the SKP presupposes that the party's Central Committee will reject demands to punish the minority Communists. On Saturday it even appeared that purges will not be initiated. The resolution of the most difficult problems will be transferred to work groups and future negotiations.

The front line in the SKP Central Committee does not run in a straight line between Saarinen and Sinisalo as in past years. The Saarinen--Sinisalo axis is pretty much unanimous. It is opposed primarily by a so-called rebellion movement, which even in the Central Committee has demanded purges for the purpose of opening impasses.

Representatives of the rebellion movement demanded in the Central Committee on Saturday that Taistoite TIEDONANTAJA Editor-in-Chief Urho Jokinen be purged from the party's policy-making committee or the so-called Politburo.

MP's Esko-Juhani Tennila, Marjatta Stenius-Kaukonen, and Seppo Toiviainen were also prevented from being purged from the Politburo. It was also demanded that TIEDONANTAJA be disciplined in one way or another.

Sinisalo and other minority members rejected the punishments and stated that they would result in a party split. Also it was announced in the greetings sent from Moscow that relations between the SKP and the CPSU would suffer if minority Communists are purged from the SKP.

### "The Patient Cannot Die"

The SKP Central Committee will continue its catastrophic meeting on Sunday and if necessary even on Monday. From the speeches of the party leadership one received the impression that everything will remain nearly the same after the decisions of the Central Committee.

Saarinen admitted that he is "annoyed and quite fed up with the disunited and undisciplined situation that has continued for more than 10 years".

"The SKP is indeed disabled. There are many individuals who are more or less disabled, but are careful that they do not become worse not to mention the fact that they would commit suicide as a result of their disablement," stated Saarinen.

"There are illnesses which can be treated, but their treatment sometimes takes a long time. There are certain signs that the SKP's illness can be treated without a major operation, an operation from which the patient could die or become even more disabled," continued Saarinen.

Saarinen stated that previous conflicts have already decreased at the job-site level. He stated that he believes that the idea of unity still reaches to the level of the party's leadership organs. However, this presupposes a strict abandonment of factionalism as well as a greater tolerance of differing ideas in the future.

It was considered probable on Saturday that the SKP will still convene an extraordinary congress this spring. This in spite of the fact that in Saarinen's opinion proper preparations cannot be made for such a congress in this confused situation.

Saarinen reiterated a previous idea presented by him that he himself is ready to resign from the party leadership if necessary and make room for others. The so-called rebellion movement, whose "chief organ" has primarily been KANSAN TAHTO published in Oulu, has supported a change of party leadership.

The minority Communists, a portion of the majority, and the CPSU are, however, of the opinion that continued party unity presupposes the presence of Saarinen and Sinisalo.



## Delegation to Moscow

SKP First Secretary Arvo Aalto proposed in the majority faction of the Central Committee a plan according to which the Central Committee would be reconvened in a couple weeks. During the interim the party would be able to negotiate those urgent problems which are now being postponed.

Aalto's proposed plan also includes the idea that the SKP would send a delegation to Moscow on a consultation trip before the next meeting of the Central Committee.

The most urgent problems include, among other things, the fact that the SKDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] parliamentary faction is divided in two -- the minority members are excluded from parliamentary faction activities until the end of the election period.

Saarinen thought that the party's MP's are more bound to their factions than others. According to Saarinen this is a result of the fact that factionalism has over the years become a way of life. Each MP has had to find his own support group -- majority or minority -- and an MP cannot slide even in small issues for fear of losing his support group.

According to Saarinen an MP's relatively good economic situation strengthens his dependence on a support group. "This is an individual human factor, which complicates the accomplishment of unity in the parliamentary faction."

## Decisions Should Be Honored

Saarinen proposed on Saturday a five-point program for ensuring the unity of the party. The central concept of the program is that decisions are to be honored everywhere in the party regardless of whether the decision was made unanimously or by a vote.

According to Saarinen unity does not exclude a struggle of opinions. Saarinen proposes that the Central Committee make a decision that each member of the Central Committee agree to carry out the rules of the party in the future.

According to Saarinen's proposal the differences concerning the decisions of last summer's party congress do not give Central Committee members or party members in general the right to come out in a manner differing from the decisionmaking organs.

## Saarinen Ready To Quit Post

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Feb 82 p 9

[Article: "Saarinen Ready to Resign"]

[Text] Chairman Aarne Saarinen wants to resign from the leadership of the quarrelsome Communist Party as soon as possible. On Sunday Saarinen stated that he sincerely hopes the party leadership will change at the extraordinary congress in May.

The convening of an extraordinary congress was the only concrete decision which the SKP Central Committee was able to make at an emergency session in Helsinki. The Central Committee unanimously decided that the congress will be held on 14--15 May.

The decision ensured that the Communist Party will not yet split. The urgent purges, which increase the danger of a split, were postponed until the extraordinary congress. The purges include a change of leadership.

The last SKP congress was held in Helsinki last May. Now the same 500 representatives of the party rank and file will assemble a year later to find a treatment for the same illnesses. The main problem is how to prevent the final split of the party and also how to stop the decline in support.

Saarinen stated on Sunday that he gave credit to the fact that a unanimous decision was made on the convening of a congress. He believes that the unity of the party, which is on the brink of dissolution, will become stronger by May and that among Communists there is sufficient responsibility and reason that the party's new rise is possible.

Saarinen, who has suffered a decline of prestige in the majority faction of the Central Committee or his faction, was irritated by questions concerning his own position, questions he considered to be detestable.

Saarinen pointed out several times that he is ready to make room for others in the party leadership. "I sincerely hope that this will happen at the extraordinary congress. I am not an ambitious man," stated Saarinen.

#### Same Problems Next Spring

SKP Vice Chairman Taisto Sinisalo admitted on Sunday that the extraordinary congress will encounter those very same problems that the Central Committee had now intended to resolve. Sinisalo was satisfied with the fact that at least for the time being "administrative actions" were avoided or with the fact that a purging of minority Communists from leadership positions was given up.

Also for the time being nothing will be done to the minority communist newspaper TIEDONANTAJA, which has been on the firing line. The press question will indeed be subjected to clarification in the party. An alternative has been presented according to which TIEDONANTAJA, KOMMUNISTI, and PAIVAN POSTI will be unified into one weekly party paper.

Also minority Communist leader Sinisalo's position in the SKP leadership will weigh in the balance in the event that the extraordinary congress considers that unity presupposes a house cleaning in the party leadership.

The SKP's repairmen, Saarinen and Sinisalo, as seen in the eyes of the so-called rebellion movement are both symbols of party division. A serious attempt was made to change the party leadership at last May's congress already, but at that time the rebellion failed primarily due to a lack of leadership.

#### Aalto Believes in New Program

SKP First Secretary Arvo Aalto was a little bit disappointed that the Central Committee was not able to make decisions meaning a real and decisive change. Aalto is a member of the majority faction.

However, Aalto stated that he believes the process now initiated will bring about a better Communist Party. Aalto placed much hope in the party's new program, which is being prepared.

In the new program there is no intent to argue over ideology according to Aalto. However, it should meet the challenges of today's Finnish society better than before.

#### New Opportunity for Rebellion Movement

The new congress will offer an opportunity for revenge for the SKP's so-called rebellion movement, which originated primarily in the districts of Oulu, Lapland, and Kainuu. The northern districts are controlled by the majority Communists.

The rebellion movement was defeated at the last congress. However, within the last year party division has increased to such a degree that this rebellion movement, which supports a heavy hand, has received additional support. This was also increased by a defeat in the electoral elections.

In the hallways of the Cultural House there was talk over the weekend that large party sections have decided not to pay their membership dues as long as the present course in the SKP continues. Also individual members have refused to pay their dues.

The backbone of the rebellion movement was formed, for example, by the majority of the so-called majority Communists at the last congress. It was opposed by the majority of the Taistoites or minority Communists as well as by a minority in the majority faction. Saarinen and Sinisalo were forced to depend on the latter-mentioned combination in the Central Committee meeting over the weekend.

The more determined representatives of the rebellion movement are of the opinion that the restoration of unity in the party requires that

it first be dissolved. Such ideas have been presented by, among others, Editor-in-Chief Into Kangas of the party's Oulu-based newspaper KANSAN TAHTO.

#### Politburo Members

Between congresses the SKP Central Committee is the party's highest decisionmaking organ. In the present Central Committee the power relationships between the majority and the minority are 29--21.

In practice, however, the Central Committee's power relationships do not always follow the traditional division between Saarinenites and Sinisaloites, but a portion of the "Saarinenites" (the so-called rebellion movement) is in opposition to Saarinen.

The practical work of the party is directed by the policy-making committee or the so-called Politburo, which is elected from among the Central Committee. The majority faction members in the Politburo are Arvo Aalto, Aarno Aitamurto, Erkki Kauppila, Olavi Hanninen, Aarne Saarinen, Inger Hirvela, Jouko Kajanoja, Tutta Tallgren, Maija-Liisa Halonen, and Arvo Kemppainen.

The Politburo's minority Communists are Seppo Toiviainen, Taisto Sinisalo, Urho Jokinen, Marjatta Stenius-Kaukonen, Esko-Juhani Tennila, and Pentti Salo.

#### Years of Division

During its present era of division the Communist Party has attempted to restore unity five times already. Divisions in the party have existed since 1966 when Aarne Saarinen became the party's leader primarily with the support of the trade union leadership.

However, the new leadership, which attempted to rid itself of Stalinism, received opposition from the old leadership faction lead by Aimo Aaltonen. The power struggle came to a climax in 1969 when the Stalinists marched out to hold their own meeting.

The party attempted to restore unity at the extraordinary congress in 1970. Decisions concerning unity were also made in 1972. During those years the Soviet Communist Party forcefully promoted the restoration of unity.

The Stalinists and subsequently the new faction called Taistoites have over the years, however, become an increasingly separate group. The division has become so distinct that positions to the party's ruling organs and election candidates have become divided along those lines.

As long as the Communists have been in the government the Taistoites have in practice been in opposition. The division became aggravated

during the presidential elections, in which the majority electoral college members voted for Mauno Koivisto and the minority members voted for Kalevi Kivisto.

There is an especially aggravated split in the parliamentary faction of the SKDL. The minority members have been excluded from the communist parliamentary faction until the end of the election period. In practice the Taistoites have appeared as their own faction even before this.

10576

CSO: 3107/66



POLITICAL

FINLAND

BRIEFS

OPINIONS ON POLAND POLLED--At the beginning of the year, one half of the Finns believed that the situation in Poland presented only a limited threat to peace in Finland. One third believed that the situation in Poland posed no threat whatsoever to Finland, while one fifth described the situation as rather threatening or extremely threatening. This was indicated by an opinion poll commissioned by the Planning Commission for Defense Information. The results of the poll show, however, that the Finns saw the situation as somewhat more threatening than in October, when the previous poll was taken. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 7 Feb 82 p 18] 9336

CSO: 3109/104

## GOVERNMENT POLICIES SEEN INADEQUATE FOR DEFENSE THREATS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23-24 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by Michel Schneider, managing editor, STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE magazine: "Capitulation Without Fighting by 1985?"]

[Text] The promises made before the last presidential and legislative elections by Messrs Francois Mitterrand and Charles Hernu might cause some people to look forward to the advent of a new era in the matter of national defense: rapid increase in France's strategic nuclear forces, making up the delays in the implementation of the planning law, and reform of national service.

These are fallacious promises because, behind the speeches, which certainly were more "orthodox" than those of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, appears the absence of any defense policy capable of coping with the level of threat we face. Mr Charles Hernu himself told the Defense Committee: "Considering Soviet primacy in the area of counterforce capacity, the period of maximum danger will come around 1984 and 1985." On 10 December, General Mery, the former chief of staff of the armed forces, at the CHEA [Center for Higher Atlantic Studies?] recalled: "The coming years will be extremely dangerous."

## Dwindling Europe

The political and military leaders know perfectly well that, in 1984-1985, we might find ourselves in the dramatic situation of having to bow to nuclear blackmail by the Soviet Union.

Before the start of American rearmament, beginning with 1986, the Soviet Union, which would no longer be able to continue the arms race for economic and undoubtedly political reasons, will inevitably be tempted, before that time, to play its ace card in the European theater. The USSR, at the height of its military power, will have to take the historical chance offered it by a Europe in the midst of a process of moral, economic, political, and military crumbling. All the signs are there and the latest can be symbolized by the extremely cautious statements--which history will judge to be dishonorable--made by Western officials after the military coup in Warsaw.

In the golden book of European decadence, the words of Claude Cheysson like those of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt mark a new and lugubrious phase.

As far as France is concerned, the surveys conducted agree clearly that the surge of determination and of spirit was destroyed and with it the surge for defense. In

May 1980, 72 percent of the French declared that they were against the use of nuclear weapons (IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute]-LE POINT). In November 1981, 55 percent of the population approved the pacifist demonstrations manipulated by Moscow (IFOP-VSD [expansion unknown]). In case of a serious threat from the USSR, 75 percent of the French would prefer to negotiate a compromise with the Soviets rather than getting into a conflict (SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company]-LE FIGARO). Finally, early in December 1981, two out of three draftees did not feel ready for combat and a majority among them maintained that military service had diminished the notion of patriotism which they might have (Public-S.A.-PARIS MATCH). When it comes to the spirit of things, France is ready to fall.

On the military level, the situation is catastrophic and will be even more so in 1984. In the face of a Soviet threat, expressed by the SS-20 but also--why not say so--by the SS-22 and SS-23, France will be unable to use its nuclear forces which, in the eyes of the adversary and in the eyes of the chief of state, would have lost any deterrent capability. In the crunch, the French would, without fighting, accept the "acceptable" political compromise that would seal France's destiny.

The defense of the territory in depth and civil defense (0.3 percent of the military budget in 1982 instead of 2.5 percent in 1963) are nonexistent. Moreover, in the key ministries, in the Ministry of Transportation, and in the Office of the Attorney General, the socialist administration (knowingly?) has placed men in the pay of Soviet imperialism who are instigating "civil insecurity" and bringing about their country's total disorganization.

#### What Deterrence?

France's nuclear forces, the last defense of our liberties, have already fallen below the credibility threshold. Without means for identifying targets, with relay communications systems, France's 40 Pluton [missiles] would take 72 hours to reach the First Army. Easily spotted, they could, like the Jaguar and Mirage III aircraft of FATAF [Tactical Air Force] (30 payloads for 75 aircraft!) be knocked out by the use or threat of use of SS-20 or SS-22 which carry enhanced-radiation weapons. By the same token, it would suffice for the Soviets to have "turned" one or two officers so that the order to fire the S-3 missile on the plateau of Albion would never be carried out (the two officers permanently assigned are not stationed right at the entrance to the firing positions and one of them could easily neutralize his colleague). In 1984-1985, we would still only have one or two SSBN's on patrol. An accident, real or engineered, cannot be ruled out a priori, and the president of the republic could, at the decisive moment, find himself psychologically and militarily incapable of mustering any deterrent threat.

The defense minister may devote what little money he has to putting the RDG [general communications network?] on designated bands or improve the situation of workers at the Cherbourg arsenal; but the fact remains that the share of the defense budget, which had been around 17 percent since 1977, will drop to 15.58 percent in 1982. On 4 December, the senators unanimously adopted the defense budget and the opposition withdrew its amendments.

As on the eve of 1940, the nation has the ministers, the members of parliament, and the generals it deserves.

Mac Arthur said: "In war, the history of failure can be summarized in two words: too late." What statesman, what officers would say: "No!"? In 3 years, France could make an exceptional effort to try to guarantee its survival as a free country: launching of an additional SSBN by 1985, speedup of the commissioning of "L'Inflexible," launching of reconnaissance satellites, strengthening of communications, accelerated deployment of ASMP [medium-range air-to-ground missile], redeployment of French conventional forces and activation of reserves, development of self-protection measures and construction of shelters for civil defense.

There are no obstacles that cannot be overcome if there is only a determination to do so; where there is a will, there is a way. There is no such thing as historical inevitability. Let us remember the words of General de Gaulle: "There are moments when the determination of a few men can shatter the patterns of determinism and open up new ways!"

5058

CSO: 3100/319

## REORGANIZATION, ACTIONS OF SDECE SINCE ELECTION EXAMINED

Paris LE MATIN in French 25 Jan 82 p 5

[Article by Pascal Krop]

[Text] What good is the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counter-espionage Service]? Is French espionage still that wonderful intelligence tool with more than 3,000 agents serving French interests throughout the world? Have not some of its members been likened to semimercenaries--experts in carrying out surprise attacks for African potentates? It has taken Pierre Marion, the SDECE's boss, and Francois de Grossouvre, who handles those matters at the Elysee Palace, 7 months to explore the problems existing in the SDECE. The new director general has now put an end to certain excesses while also deciding to make a thorough review of the activities of his departments. The funds available to the SDECE's branches abroad have been increased, and new analysis teams are being set up. A sizable effort is also being made to modernize equipment, and this will noticeably alter the possibilities of the technical departments. Regaining control was not achieved without upheaval--the recent Chadian affair proves that--and several dozen members of the civilian and military staffs have been induced to quit their jobs.

Torn by its internal quarrels, the "swimming pool" (as the SDECE is familiarly known) expected to undergo a major purge last 10 May. But at first, nothing happened. A big developed country does not destroy one of its chief sources of intelligence with impunity. While they wanted to assert control of the SDECE, the Socialists nevertheless did not intend to deprive themselves of the information, both military and economic, that every industrialized country needs. So the strategy adopted was one of methodically reorganizing the SDECE while insisting that certain branches of the service break with the "bad habits" inherited from the past.

The SDECE's diversification and specialization had led some of its members in recent years to more or less lose sight of their original missions. It was during the war, in November 1943, that Jacques Soustelle established the DGSS (General Directorate of Special Services). It became the DGER (General Directorate for Studies and Research) when the war ended and the SDECE at the start of 1947. French



espionage has always had the double objective of collecting any kind of information in foreign countries that might interest the government and of neutralizing foreign agents who might harm the country's security.

Under Valery Giscard d'Estaing, however, part of the SDECE had tended to withdraw into national territory, where it gave priority to combating "misinformation" and participating in the fight against terrorism. That work was done in cooperation with the DST (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance), which is responsible to the Ministry of Interior, and it sometimes took on the appearance of a real witch hunt, with SDECE agents themselves as its victims.

In French intelligence circles at the time, there was even a rumor that counter-espionage agents had started working for the Soviets, and several officials were replaced. The SA (Action Service), which is responsible for intervention abroad, had gradually asserted its autonomy within the SDECE--to the point that Cercottes paratroopers (so named from the SA's training center in Loiret) have been known to carry out operations in Africa on their own responsibility.

Last 17 June, when 60-year-old Pierre Marion arrived to assume his new post on Mortier Boulevard in Paris, he arrived alone. His tone was affable and courteous, but the man had character. To begin with, there was a firm warning: anyone who might feel like challenging, in one way or another, the election results of 10 May could leave. The former SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Company] official for North America was to patiently size up that hydra of information constituted by the SDECE. Most of the officials cooperated without hesitation, but it sometimes took several months for Pierre Marion to get clarification on this or that point.

#### More Departures

In August, the director general decided to undertake the first reorganization and parted company with some of his staff. He removed those who had been close collaborators with Alexandre de Marenches, his predecessor. More recently, in December, more than 20 SDECE agents were induced to resign for "dereliction of duty." The SDECE is a huge puzzle, and Pierre Marion owes it to himself to be thoroughly familiar with all its ins and outs if he wants to improve the efficiency and quality of intelligence while also putting an end to certain excesses. Personal rivalries and the warfare between departments (research directorate, counterespionage, and action) have long raged within the SDECE. In recent years, the press has often reported on the settling of accounts within the institution.

The new directorate visibly intends to put an end to such behavior, and Pierre Marion has not hesitated to order the establishment of several investigating commissions, including one on the "Clement affair." Clement is the SDECE official who was accused without proof of working for the USSR. That concern for clarification was intended to quell the internal quarrels. And it seems now that people are a little calmer.

#### Chadian Affair and Polish Crisis

The elimination from the SDECE's organization chart of a number of intermediate positions between the general directorate and the various departments also helped put

an end to certain feudal situations. This regaining of control is being accompanied by a greater centralization of intelligence to prevent the departments from doing too much as they please. Answering directly to the director general is a new analysis team called "prospective planning and evaluation." It will be responsible for drawing up political summaries directly usable by the government. Industrial intelligence, which is tending to occupy more and more space, should also be one of that group's objectives. That type of work has been somewhat neglected until now, and studies are underway to evaluate the possibilities in that area. In this connection, it will be noted that economic interests have a very direct influence on the missions assigned to the intelligence services. For example, the SDECE took hardly any interest in the recent events in Ghana because France had no particular interests to protect in that country.

For its part, counterespionage has been beefed up considerably. New positions have been created recently in the most sensitive zones. The modernization of equipment, including communications, is also underway. The installation of data processing should also result in improved efficiency in the "research department."

The Chadian affair occurred last October in the midst of the reorganization. On the night of 28 October, an AFP dispatch announced that an armored Libyan column had just entered N'Djamena and that President Goukouni had reportedly disappeared. The news was repeated by Radio France International, and French troops stationed on the Cameroonian frontier were put on alert by their colonel. In Paris, the Elysee Palace and the Ministry of Defense asked the SDECE's directorate for information on the situation.

In its first note, the French intelligence service informed the government that the situation was calm, but that it had not been able to locate President Goukouni. Not until that night was the SDECE's directorate advised by its agents that President Goukouni had absented himself for the evening but was still in N'Djamena. The news was public knowledge the next morning, and there was open talk at the Elysee Palace of an attempt at misinformation. Some were openly accusing the SDECE of manipulation and even of making mysterious arms shipments. Others--in the Ministry of Cooperation, for example--pointed out that the SDECE's directorate had been informed as early as the beginning of July of agitation by certain agents based in Chad. Several Socialist officials seized the opportunity to express once again their mistrust of the SDECE.

The Elysee Palace therefore asked all the intelligence services, including the DST and the SDECE, to conduct the investigation. The investigation revealed that an occasional freelancer for the AFP who had once belonged to the SDECE was the one who had started the rumor. Also implicated were members of the French colony in Gabon close to the Gaullist networks established previously by Jacques Foccart. On the other hand, there was nothing to indicate that the SDECE's central units, including the "research department," had played any part in the affair. Since that false alarm, the Elysee Palace has retained its confidence in the intelligence institution, which has continued to inform it daily, through the same channels, concerning the Chadian situation.

The Polish crisis was to give several members of the government a new opportunity to appreciate the SDECE's efficiency. Since last fall, the SDECE has been sending

all its reports not only to the Elysee Palace but also to the prime minister, the Ministry of External Relations, and the Ministry of Defense, to which it officially belongs. If we are to believe observers, there is no comparison between the detailed analyses submitted by the SDECE during this period and the notes--which are succinct, to say the least--that are submitted by the General Secretariat of National Defense (SGDN), which is directly responsible to the Prime Minister's Office and is headed by General Rhenter.

On more than one occasion before General Jaruzelski decreed the state of emergency in Poland, the SDECE had informed the government that a "military solution" was imminent. Throughout the crisis, the intelligence service has also reported in detail concerning the unrest in the Polish Armed Forces and the debates within the church. It has done methodical and patient work to which the CIA has paid tribute several times in the recent past.

11798

CSO: 3100/320

## ITALY-ALGERIA LABOR UNION COOPERATION

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 28 Jan 82 pp 51-53

[Texts of agreement and joint communique]

[Text] Algiers, 12 Jan 82--Among the problems requiring more attention and a greater commitment from the United Federation at all levels is the development of cooperation on an equal footing with Third World countries, especially those located in the Mediterranean basin. In this connection cooperation between Italy and Algeria could have served as a model (as well as furnishing considerable opportunities for exchanges and for complementarity between important sectors of the two economies) if difficulties had not arisen which the trade union intends to help eliminate, in the interest of the workers of both countries.

The documents we are publishing (a joint communique on the El Djazair meetings of 10-12 January between a delegation of the Federation and the secretariat of UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers]; protocol for cooperation between Italian and Algerian trade unions) are the basis of future activities in this field.

## Agreement

Following the visit to Algeria of a delegation of the CGIL-CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions]-UIL [Italian Union of Labor] led by Luciano Lama, secretary general of the CGIL, Franco Marini, deputy secretary general of the CISL, and Giorgio Benvenuto, secretary general of the UIL.

Considering the friendly and cordial relations existing between UGTA and the CGIL-CISL-UIL United Federation, based on a broad identity of views and on a common will to defend the rights and interests of all workers, considering that these relations have been reinforced both bilaterally and within the framework of the joint struggle of the whole international trade union movement in pursuit of the goals of progress, justice and freedom, the two delegations agree, in accordance with the decisions set forth in the joint declaration, to establish the following cooperation agreement.

#### 1) Consolidation and broadening of bilateral relations.

In order to establish and develop fruitful and lasting cooperation in all fields of common interest to UGTA and the CSIL-CISL-UIL Federation, the parties agree to exchange experience and information about the situations of the trade unions and the economies and social conditions in the two countries. Besides contributing to a deeper mutual understanding of the tasks to be accomplished by both parties, this cooperation will consolidate the basis of the Italian-Algerian development agreement, which the two organizations intend to sustain in a coherent way.

To this end the two organizations agree to hold a conference in Palermo in the near future at which UGTA and the CGIL-CSIL-UIL Federation will meet to find concrete ways of contributing all they can to a strengthening and broadening of cooperation between the two countries, on the basis of the principles of just and equitable international cooperation which respects the rights and interests of all concerned.

#### 2) Cooperation on emigration.

Convinced of the need to work together and coordinate their activities in favor of emigrant workers, the two organizations decide to hold periodic consultations and to reach joint decisions and commitments, whenever possible, to undertake joint initiatives regarding problems bearing on emigration within the framework of the countries' bilateral relations and of relevant international organizations, in particular the ILO.

The two organizations also agree to contribute, within the framework of the trade unions, to a search for solutions to the problems associated with the stay of migrant workers in host countries and with their return to their own countries by jointly taking concrete steps designed to:

- defend migrant workers against all forms of discrimination;
- create conditions favoring their reassimilation in their own countries;
- intervene with governments to promote an agreement on the social security convention.

#### 3) Cooperation on vocational training.

To achieve the betterment and emancipation of workers, the two organizations decide to agree on and engage in joint initiatives to contribute to vocational training of workers in Algeria.

To this end, UGTA and the CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation agree on the need to explore all possible ways and means of cooperating at the trade union level, and between the two countries, to achieve the participation of Italian trade unions and of Italy in the national vocational training program in Algeria.

#### 4) International cooperation.

Proclaiming their full adherence to the principles set forth at the Belgrade Conference, the two organizations undertake to work together for the implementation of the decisions adopted at that conference.



To achieve this objective, UGTA and the CGIL-CISL-UIL Federation agree on the need to take joint steps to create conditions conducive to the convening of a conference of Mediterranean trade union on the problems of cooperation, peace and security in the Mediterranean basin.

The two organizations also agree to consult with each other and to adopt common positions and take joint action bearing on the issue of the New International Economic Order, both through regional and international trade union conferences and at the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The two organizations will coordinate their activities at the ILO to act more effectively on behalf of the workers.

In order to ensure the regular implementation of this cooperation agreement, and perhaps enlarge it, the two organizations decide to meet every year in Algiers and Rome and whenever it is considered necessary.

#### Joint Communiqué

At the invitation of the General Union of Algerian Workers, and returning a visit made by an UGTA delegation to Rome in April 1981, a delegation of the United Federation of the Italian trade unions CGIL-CISL-UIL headed by Luciano Lama, secretary general of the CGIL, Franco Marini, deputy secretary general of the CISL, and Giorgio Benvenuto, secretary general of the UIL, and comprising comrades Marianetti and Giulianati, deputy secretary general and international relations officer of the CGIL respectively; Del Piano and Gabaglio, confederate secretary and head of the international department of the CISL respectively; and Conte and Berteletti, national secretary of UILM and head of the international department of the UIL respectively, visited Algiers on 10-12 January 1982.

During its stay the Italian United Federation was received by Mohamed Sherif Messadia, member of the political office and head of the permanent secretariat of the central committee of the FLN (National Liberation Front).

The delegation met with the minister of energy to discuss economic relations as a whole between Italy and Algeria, with special emphasis on the energy sector.

The delegation met several times with an UGTA delegation headed by Secretary General Demene-Debbih Abdellah and composed of the national secretaries Chaa Mohamed, Boudina Mustapha, Ait Abdelmalek Ouameur, Belhadj-Bakir Hassene, and Berra-Bah Mokhtar, as well as Briki Yousef, member of the national executive commission.

These meetings gave the CGIL-CISL-UIL United Federation delegation an opportunity to learn about various aspects of economic, social and political development in Algeria and about the struggle being waged by Algerian workers and UGTA on behalf of their country's production so that Algeria might cease to be underdeveloped and so that the nation's economy might become independent.

The talks, which were held in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding, emphasized in particular an examination of bilateral relations between the two

countries and a strengthening of the ties of solidarity and cooperation which unite UGTA and the CGIL-CSIL-UIL Federation.

The two delegations thoroughly examined the international situation in a comprehensive manner, exchanging views on all the issues of concern to workers.

They reaffirm their belief in and commitment toward the establishment of a new brand of relations among states and a new concept of collective security based on a full recognition of the right of all peoples to independence, self-determination for national sovereignty, and the free choice of one's own way to development, as well as their commitment toward international cooperation among all states within the framework of an equitable new economic and social order.

The two delegations, while taking note of some differences of opinion, express their great concern about the worsening of tensions in the world and the blows dealt to the sovereignty of peoples.

In this context the two organizations are working actively to make the Mediterranean Sea free from any foreign military presence and a factor for economic, social and cultural cooperation to the advantage of all the workers of coastal states.

As for the struggle of peoples for independence, sovereignty, freedom, and dignity, the two organizations reaffirm their full solidarity with all national liberation movements fighting against imperialism, colonialism, racism, apartheid and every other form of domination and dependence.

The two delegations express their support for the just anticolonial struggle being waged by the Saharaoui people under the leadership of its representative the Polisario Front, and affirm their right to self-determination in accordance with the resolutions of the OAU (Organization of African Unity), the non-aligned states and the United Nations. They state their firm opposition to all foreign interference and all maneuvers tending to internationalize the conflict.

Regarding the situation in the Middle East, while taking note of some differences of opinion about the conditions likely to restore peace in this part of the world, the two delegations reaffirm their belief that a real and lasting solution must entail the restoration of all the national rights of the Palestinian people --under the leadership of its sole and legitimate representative, the PLO--and the unconditional evacuation of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

They denounce the occupation and annexation of Golan, which is Syrian territory.

The two delegations condemn the aggression and threats which the Lebanese people and workers have been subjected to and the external aid that has been given to reactionary secessionist Lebanese elements. They reaffirm their support for the progressive forces of Lebanon in their struggle for the integrity, unity, sovereignty, and independence of Lebanon.

Regarding Africa, the two organizations declare their firm opposition to all imperialist interference and to any foreign presence which tends to perpetuate the dependent status of African countries.

They also reaffirm their firm determination to work actively to eliminate the hateful apartheid regime from southern African and undertake to do everything in their power to give concrete support to the struggles of the peoples of Namibia and South African under the leadership of their authentic representatives, SWAMPO and ANC (African National Council) for independence, freedom and dignity.

Bearing in mind their common ideals of justice, freedom and progress, the two parties undertake to fight together against all attacks on fundamental freedoms and the freedoms of trade unions in all countries in the world where these freedoms are now violated.

Examining the problem of emigration, the two organizations record with satisfaction their identity of views, and therefore stress the obligation of host countries to give immigrant workers concrete guarantees of equal status and equal social rights. They condemn every tendency to discrimination and racism, and in this connection they agree to coordinate their efforts in international force to combat these practices and ensure the effective defense of the rights and interests of emigrant workers.

Going on to a thorough analysis of developments on the international economic scene, the two parties express their lively concern about the deep and lasting crisis which is seriously affecting primarily poor countries in their development efforts and workers' living and working conditions, and which is causing massive unemployment in industrialized countries.

Deeply convinced of the need for workers and their trade union organizations to act together in a united way to promote the new international economic order, the two organizations advocate the establishment of international economic relations on a completely new basis.

In this context they undertake to work for international cooperation based on mutual advantage, taking into account the interests of all concerned and in strict respect for the sovereignty of every State over its own resources and national wealth.

In this connection UGTA and the CGIL-CSIL-UIL Federation have agreed to act together to consolidate and broaden the achievements of the Belgrade World Trade Union Conference on Development.

Regarding Algerian-Italian cooperation, and taking into account the complementarity of their economies, the two organizations discussed the possibility of reinforcing this cooperation, on the basis of mutual interests and advantages, to promote an improvement in the standards of living and working conditions of the workers in the two countries. In stressing the need for a positive solution to important existing issues, the two organizations studied ways and means of organizing a conference for Algerian and Italian trade unions in Palermo as the trade unions' contribution to the implementation of economic cooperation as defined in particular at the Belgrade conference.

The two delegations express their appreciation for this opportunity to meet, and --in view of the friendship between Italian and Algerian workers and their common struggle for peace, justice, social progress and a new international economic

order--agree to develop a program for exchange and cooperation between UGTA and the CGIL-CSIL-UIL Federation.

The CGIL-CSIL-UIL Federation's delegation thank UGTA and the Algerian workers for their warm reception.

9855

CS0: 3104/105

## POWER STRUGGLE IN LABOR, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 23 Jan 82 pp 14-16

[Article by Dieudonnee Ten Berge: "Power Struggle in the CDA and PvdA"]

[Text] The near future of Dutch politics was determined over the past few days in the little town of Garderen in the Veluwe District. In a training institute, the modern equivalent of the retreat house, the two biggest parties in our country experienced their own identity, as put so concealed in the terminology of the welfare worker. First the big men of the PvdA [Labor Party] brushed off one another's overcoats, and after that it was the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] strategists. What is to become of us? Dieudonnee Ten Berge takes a look at a week of political navel contemplation.

The big parties of the coalition--CDA and the PvdA--are not only wrestling with one another, but also with themselves. The PvdA is taken aback by the way its determination to govern at any cost has translated into a massive loss of votes. Both the CDA and the PvdA are due for a change of the guard, and therefore the power struggle is in full force in both parties.

The Labor Party is confronted with the remarkable paradox that now that the party has come to participate in the government, it is not losing to the Left, but instead just to the Right. You would expect that the "watering of the wine," which is inherent in coalition governing, would scare off precisely those who were most principled. But to the contrary, the Labor Party, according to the latest samplings, would lose to the parties on its right. Viewed superficially, then, the socialists are still too far to the left for many of their voters, even though they have been so good as to gather around under Van Agt's umbrella.

For the PvdA leadership, this is a horrible dilemma. Must the party become even more realistic, and thereby lose its credibility with its more engaged following, or must the party instead be firm in its principles, and thereby destroy its position within the coalition, with disastrous elections as a result? For the time being, the PvdA seems to be choosing in favor of the course to the right, for only a longer cabinet term can put the socialists into a position where they can set matters straight. One factor influencing all of this is Den Uyl's position. The



leader of the part in the 1970's has become a symbol of the party's dogmatic insistence on its own way, and thereby by himself produces a danger to the continuing existence of the coalition. Let him go, then. Furthermore, Den Uyl's downfall would put the Rotterdam lobby in a position to push Andre Van Der Louw forcefully as the new leader of the socialist in the 1980's.

The same struggle for leadership is going on in the CDA. It is clear that Van Agt will not lead the party for another cabinet term or two. Within the CDA there are two obvious successors: Ruud Lubbers and Sjeng Kremers. Very heavy fighting is already going on within the CDA for Van Agt's legacy. To be sure, Kremers is keeping his distance to a certain extent, but Lubbers in particular is active in clearing his own path. At the moment, Lubbers does not have any chance at all against Van Agt. But that does not slow him down very much, for the longer the present coalition lasts, the less hold Van Agt will have on a new cabinet period.

Thus it helps Lubbers if the cabinet survives at least 2 years. And there the interests of Lubbers and the PvdA coincide. For a break in the near future means, as has already been said, a serious loss of votes for the PvdA. For Lubbers, it means that Van Agt will become the standard bearer again, and later that he would, as the negotiator in the coalition formation, push Kremers forward as minister-president. Once prime minister, Kremers has all the time he needs to develop himself as the leader of the CDA, at Lubber's expense. Therefore, no crisis in the near future. Unless, for example, Van Der Stee or de Koning is willing to function as the temporary leader of the CDA. Lubbers has already studied both cards, because in that case there would not be a cloud in his sky. Neither Van der Stee nor De Koning will be suitable to lead the party for very long, while then Kremers would be out of play and would not be able to develop his position. Therefore, a cabinet crisis in the near future, no matter what the national interest involved is, is only good for Lubbers if it leads to Van Der Stee's or De Koning's becoming premier.

During the Christmas recess, Lubbers traveled around the country. Carrying boxes of bonbons for the ladies, he visited Fons Van Der Stee, Piet (CDA godfather) Steenkamp, went all the way to Maastricht to drink a glass of wine with Governor Sjeng Kremers and also landed in the hospital room of Party Chairman Piet Burkman, who had ordained that during his recovery process from a thyroid operation he did not want to see anyone from politics. Lubbers is his own public relations agent.

The Lubbers wing is best served by Den Uyl's removal. Just as in the case of the socialists, Joop's [Den Uyl's] departure could only benefit the peace of the coalition. And it is particularly Lubber's chances that increase the longer the current cabinet lasts. Now the socialists, too, know the fall of Den Uyl would call for a compensating sacrifice. That could be found either in the removal of Van Agt, with two variations: either Van Der Stee or De Koning as prime minister, or in the removal of Van Der Stee as finance minister. That would separate the Van Agt-Van Der Stee team, by which Van Agt would be isolated.

In the meantime, the two combinations have been checked out with the upper echelons of the CDA, with the exception of Van Agt. It is a remarkable contradiction in terms that it is now precisely nota bene the right wing of the CDA which is becoming the champion of Joop Den Uyl, first, because that maintains the tension within the coalition, second, because then the PvdA is not in a position to develop his

successor, Van Der Louw, and third, because thereby Van Agt's position is not undermined. It can be put another way, too: Joop [Den Uyl] and Dries [Van Agt] need each other very much for mutual survival. This past weekend the CDA presidium labored over the problem of the CDA succession in Garderen. It has become clear that the CDA is provisionally backing Lubbers. His position within the delegation and the leadership is stronger than ever. Some telephoning around shows that they do not see any alternative, for the time being.

The Labor Party had already visited the little town of Garderen in the Veluwe District. The socialists are always going there for a bit of discussion, so that they can tell each other the unvarnished truth. The order of the day is: "It must be possible to talk things over," even though frequently such things degenerate into mudslinging. That happened once again at the conference weekend, as they term it so nicely, of Friday 15 January and Saturday 16 January. The meeting was precipitated by immediate panic. Everyone is willing to take credit for success: in time of disaster, everyone points accusingly at someone else. Participating in the government had brought the party precisely the opposite of what had been expected during the election campaign and the cabinet formation. The second Van Agt cabinet had never settled the emotions within the party and had not caused its chances to shift after 4 years' noisy opposition.

An all-out war had broken out with the brothers in the labor movement. Such formerly friendly media as VARA [the Workers' Radio Amateur Association], VRIJ NEDERLAND and the VOLKSRANT cut the party down with great regularity. The party cadre have been at one another's throats more than ever. Furthermore, many thought it was all over. People who want to build a fine political career quickly by means of a party do not feel comfortable in a losing party, for the most part. But above all, the average voters see the constantly diminishing number of seats [in the Second Chamber]. After the butchery of nine seats on 26 May, no recovery began. On the contrary, the latest NIPO [Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion] ROOIE HAAN [a VARA news program] sampling, which was a reasonable indicator of choices for and against, showed a further loss of seven seats. And that survey was carried out even before both Den Uyl and Ien Dales had aroused the people's wrath by proposing that cuts be made in the health insurance payments. Within the PvdA, they are expecting a gigantic loss in the Provincial States elections. In 1978, the party scored nearly 34 percent, now they are expecting between 20 and 25 percent. That would be an all-time low. It can also be seen from the NIPO/ROOIE HAAN survey that it is not the leftist voters who are leaving the party because they felt themselves not to be served by the stream of compromises Den Uyl and his group made during the cabinet formation in order to get into the government by any means at all. The PvdA is losing to the D'66 [Democrats of 1966, the other coalition party]. Therefore, the PvdA is seen as too far to the left, too pushy.

At the sensitivity training session in Garderen, all of the most important circuits in the party were present: the Amsterdam crowd with Max Van Den Berg, the party chairman, as its leader, the group from the Hague--Den Uyl is the personification of that--and the Rotterdam club (CRM [Culture, Recreation and Social Work] Minister Andrew Van Der Louw plays first violin there). The Amsterdam circuit, which has the party offices for its sally port, has had the wind behind it for years. The word was: "PvdA, the party of action."

Everyone who detected a social inequality found a willing ear there. First in Ien Van Den Heuvel, then in Max Van Den Berg. The "justified demands" of artists, draft refusers, supporters of abortion, ban the bomb, ban the car, and ban the man were for the most part naively accepted. The banners were paid for out of the party coffers. To be sure, other voices were heard. "The people do want to be progressive, but they are tired of all this noise. For the most part, they want to be left alone." But that sort of line--the quotation is from an interview with the chairman of the defense committee, Harry Van Den Berg--was viewed as base heresy. The action line was supported by the friends of VARA, whose programmers ought to be Labor Party members. Injustices were sought out with a magnifying glass, both within the country and abroad, and then were charged to the account of either business or the Van Agt government, and usually both at the same time. The VARA coverage of the coronation of Queen Beatrix was the shining extreme of the socially critical journalistic approach. But "the people who certainly wanted to be progressive, but were tired of all that noise" gave up their VARA membership en masse. By association, the PvdA also received quite a blow from that.

"TROS [Television-Radio Broadcasting Corporation] is the biggest workers broadcaster," former VARA personality Wim Bosboom once said. But Andre Van Duin is a curseword in socialist medialand. Programs must be critical above all, and there must definitely be no laughter. Indeed, laughter and mirth are stultifying and cause a pause in the unceasing battle of the workers against capitalist exploitation anywhere in the world. Talking about misuse of social provisions was taboo and reactionary, but the people on the assembly line found out that the reality was somewhat different, after all. Talking about criminality was termed fascism, but the PvdA voters in the older parts of the city did have to face it daily. The FNV [Netherlands Trade Union Federation] went before the Amsterdam city government last week to demand measures. ROOIE VROUWEN [VARA women's program] called the PvdA-voting housewives who tried to run their families somewhat carefully "unliberated bags," only to hire a "bag" like that as a black-paid worker. In the election campaign, the goose with the golden eggs was promised again by means of at least six fighting points. In practice, not a single point was attained. "The PvdA is undergoing a credibility crisis," Max Van Den Berg then said very neatly in Garderen.

The Amsterdam circuit wants nothing to do with the professional politicians from the Hague. There was a deluge of accusations.

At that moment, a third circuit spoke up sharply. Within the party, people talk of the "Rotterdam mafia": Andre Van Der Louw, Bram Peper, Bart Tromp, Ien Dales and Saskia Stuiveling. Andre Van Der Louw as the new charismatic leader, Tromp and Peper in the Suslov role as party ideologist, and Dales and Stuiveling as the solid executors.

Now that the Amsterdam approach has failed and the ladies and gentlemen from the Hague have proven to be too weak to set thing straight, the Rotterdam "mafia" can give it a try. They were seen to have won in Garderen. The PvdA is not going to force any cabinet crisis. No, they are meekly going to practice Realpolitik. No more politics of "promise it today, deliver it tomorrow," as Van Den Berg puts it. For us there is no alternative, the PvdA chairman feels; to go into the opposition would mean to fall back into the old politics without responsibility and without credibility. The party will not even avoid new cutbacks in March.

Van Den Berg's expectation of this new realistic course is that it will cause the people who used to vote for the PvdA to vote for it again. "We will have to place more emphasis on the practical and economic arguments," he said after the meeting at Garderen.

Things are not going well for the Labor Party. When a football team does not win any games, but just keeps on losing, generally the coach is blamed. Initially, the management does say that it is behind the much-abused coach, but suddenly he disappears.

Den Uyl's position was also discussed at Garderen. Until recently, the big leader's position was never brought up. For the public at large, nothing is going on and Joop is still untouchable. But in the coming elections, Joop will no longer pull the cart. Politics, now, are largely optics. For the people in the country, the man who gave the PvdA its image of "stubbornness" will then have disappeared. Van Der Louw, the crown prince, the man who wants to require social service from unemployed youths, is paraded primarily as a realist. Without renouncing his principles he has been able to get along very well with business interests as the mayor of Rotterdam. Andre [Van Der Louw] the new symbol of democratic realism. The only questions is when they will change the coach.

Just to round things out, within the D'66, too, a struggle for power is beginning to break out. Within D'66, Jan Terlouw's star is fading, now that he has to direct the difficult Ministry of Economic Affairs. Thus far, little of D'66's ideals can be seen in his policy. Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst is biding his time as delegation chairman. From that comfortable position, he is keeping his hands clean, while D'66 member Terlouw is letting gas be drilled for in Ameland, D'55's member Zeevalking passes off the natural beauty of Amelisweerd as a "row of bushes," and D'66 member Ineke Lambers gives permission for the dumping of radio-active wastes in the North Sea. To be sure, Van Mierlo's star is rising again, but he will shortly have to direct a defense policy for which not even Brinkhorst could get agreement in his own party.

The national interest has not been touched upon very much in this tale. Naturally, it does play a part in the various rankings, but sometimes in politics other factors can make the difference. Finally: Just who is in power in the biggest parties is important to the country.

6940

CS0: 3105/99

## DEFENSE BUDGET GEARS FOLKETING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Feb 82 p 5

[Article by g.a.: "Eleven Social Democrats Vote Against Defense Budget Compromise"]

[Excerpt] The financial implementation of the new defense program yesterday was approved by the Folketing by 123 votes against 43. This occurred when the equalization account of the budget bill was voted on. It contains those amendments resulting from the increased appropriations for the armed forces.

The 43 members who voted against these amendments were the SF (Socialist People's Party), VS (Left-Socialist Party) and the (LS) Radical Liberals, as well as 11 members from the Social Democratic group: Kristen Albertsen, Helle Degn, Soren Norgaard Sorensen, Inge Fischer Moller, Birte Weiss, Jimmy Stahr, Chr. Kelm-Hansen, Mette Groes, Sonja Mikkelsen, Ole Lovig Simonsen and Lissa Matthiasen.

On behalf of the 11 Social Democrats, Helle Degn explained that they wished for a Danish defense, and could support NATO, but that they had demanded a zero-solution, and thus not an adjustment in the form of increased appropriations for the armed forces.

During the preceding debate carried on in connection with handling of the amendment bills to the budget for 1982, the chairman of the Conservative Party, Poul Simonsen, and a Liberal Party member, Bertel Haarder, described it as being of little assurance that so many of the Social Democrats, including half of the Party's representatives in the Budget Committee, did not think that they could vote for increased appropriations in connection with the defense compromise.

CSO: 3106/73



## BUNDESWEHR SELECTS NEW AUTOMATIC CANNON

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jan 82 pp 67-68

[Text] The 20 mm machine gun Rh 202, of which approximately 10,000 copies were introduced in the Bundeswehr, may no longer be adequate with regard to its capacity for the armament of the new armored vehicle (MARDER successor), which is considered for introduction in the 1990's. For this reason, there is a need for a new weapon which, moreover, can be exchanged for the existing uses of the Rh 202. After a thorough test of company designs from Rheinmetall and Mauser, the 25 mm cannon Model E, from the Mauser firm, was chosen for further development. Although the appropriate 25 mm X 137 ammunition is standardized in NATO, there are doubts as to whether ballistic capacity will still be adequate for use twenty years hence. Manfred Meissner, junior chief of WM II "Light Weapons" in BWB, introduces the new weapon.

Since 1940 around 10,000 20 mm machine guns, type Rh 202, were manufactured by the Rheinmetall and Mauser firms (here around 3,400). They are deployed in about 6,000 gun carriages in all three branches of the Bundeswehr: in the MARDER APC, the LUCHS reconnaissance vehicle, in the engineer's boat based gun-carriage, the 20 mm field cannon DM 2, the 20 mm anti-aircraft cannon ship, and last but not least in the 20 mm anti-aircraft twin.

The tactical requirements on the family of combat vehicles of the 1990's have been worked on for quite some time. The draft is almost completed. It brings out that the MK 20 Rh 202 no longer fulfills the new requirements regarding range and penetrating capacity for a personnel carrier. Since the maximum in penetration power has already been achieved for a 20 mm cannon with the hardcore cartridge-case base ammunition DM 63, the only thing which will fulfill the requirement is a larger caliber.

During the search for a suitable ammunition, it was also taken into consideration that for reasons of time or cost, a rearming of the available 20 mm carriages could become necessary. This type of rearming to machine cannons having a caliber of up to 25 mm is still possible as far as volume and recoil capacity are concerned, but not to machine cannons for the 30 mm ammunition of the GAU-8.

For the sake of standardization, the ammunition 25 mm X 137 was chosen, as it has already been introduced by the NATO partners, the United States and the Netherlands. Already existing and available ammunition facilitates and shortens the process of developing a cannon. Because at the time the ammunition was selected it was assumed that the new cannon would be introduced before 1990, the available time was just barely sufficient since one must calculate the necessary time for cannon and turret development, which run one after the other, at approximately 15 years. At the start of the gun carriage development, the cannon and its capacity and interface must already be established.

The screening of the market shows only the 25 mm KBA machine cannon from Oerlikon and the 25 mm M 242 CHAINGUN from Hughes Helicopters. Neither, however, is suited to the interests of the Bundeswehr: too low a cadence, too large a volume, too much recoil and, in the CHAINGUN, the required foreign energy as well as the "false shot" after switching to the second type of ammunition.

Rheinmetall as well as Mauser were induced through research contracts to come up with concepts and to build functioning experimental models. Without modifying the ideas of the firms, some requirements had to be made on the models: construction for the 25 mm X 137 cartridge including Oerlikon-beltlink; belt-feed for two different types of ammunition, with a quick change; individual and automatic fire; floating mount; gas-powered; Cadence suited for "air defense of all troops;" installation dimensions suited for an exchange of the MK 20-Rh 202 with the fewest possible re-arming measures, as well as assembly and disassembly without the use of special tools.

After it was proven, with the first experimental model of each firm, through installation in the MARDER turret and through firing, that a 25 mm machine cannon can be developed, which is small enough and efficient enough, a comparison of principle with other experimental models was begun in 1979 and 1980. This comparison was conducted by Testing Facility 91 and was supposed to show which model can best produce the required performance in further development, while involving the lowest technical, financial and time risk.

After testing both models in great detail--considering the level of development--the better model was chosen, according to prior determined evaluation criteria, at the beginning of 1981. One must say at this point the "better" model, since both cannons had already achieved a high level for such an early stage in their development.

In addition to the technical achievements and characteristics, the technical risk for further development was included in the evaluation, because the technical risk can be calculated in man hours. These, in turn, must be compensated for with money of which there is never enough.

Manageability and ease of installation into the carriages--i.e., low weight and volume of components--were also evaluated, since the soldier must be able to carry, manage, install and disassemble the components without help.

The result of the evaluation: the 25 mm cannon Model E of the Mauser firm was chosen for further development. This model is an open blowback-operated weapon

with tightly locking but not self-locking, supported flap shutter. The gas-powered alternating belt feed is designed for two types of ammunition. Proven propulsion like in the double belt feed for the Rh 202; the belt feed is separate from the weapon, placed in the hinged frame so it can be moved at right angles to the weapon.

The ammunition is changed by pushing the belt feed to the side so that the base of the cartridge case of the second type of ammunition is reached by the breech-block and the pin feed wheel wave of the first ammunition is detached from the propulsion and the new one is attached; after the change-over, the newly chosen ammunition is fired immediately; while the belt feed is being discharged, all cartridges are on the belt; the ammunition is placed uniformly on both sides; the cartridges are expelled by the breech-lock directly from the belt link.

Trigger system; with rigid attachment of the grip support. Mounting: cradle and floating position. Technical data obtained during testing of the experimental model of the 25 mm machine cannon, Model E of the Mauser firm. For comparison, the data of the MK 20 Rh 202.

	MK 25	MK 20
Cadence		
Overall	600 to 1,100 rounds per min.	600 to 1,100 rounds/min.
Normal	900 rounds/min.	900 rounds/min.
Average recoil	9,000 N	7,000 N
Locking speed		
Recoil	14.5 m/sec	18.0 m/sec
Forward stroke	11 m/sec	11 m/sec
Measurements		
Length of barrel	2,100 mm	1,840 mm
Length of weapon	892 mm	888 mm
Length of barrel + weapon	2,738 mm	2,610 mm
Weight		
Complete weapon	40 kg	33 kg
Barrel	39 kg	28 kg
Belt feed	24 kg	19 kg
Weapon + barrel + belt feed	103 kg	80 kg
Cradle	52 kg	70 kg

These technical data form the basis for the further development. A few of the values show already that they are on the right track, but a few also show that some improvements must still be made. In order to be able to begin efficiently with the further development, the tactical requirements must first be issued, at least those relating to the weapon and the turret. As already stated at the beginning, the weapons installation (here: machine cannon and fire guidance system with turret) is the component which will require the longest time for development.

On the one hand one must not forget that the development of the weapons installation generally takes longer than that of the remaining system, and on the other hand the temporal succession of the development of the machine cannon and that of the weapons installation has to be taken into consideration. At present, about 15 years must be allowed for the new development of a complete armored tank turret. In the course of the next few years it still has to be cleared up as to how far a 25 mm machine cannon is supposed to replace the present 20 mm Rh 202. Through this the size of the future series is determined and the larger the number of pieces to be produced, the easier to produce the cannon must be, the higher the development costs.

In this connection, for example, the question arises as to whether the 20 mm field cannon DM 2 will later also be changed over to 25 mm or whether it should use up the MK 20 which will become available. The air force could also use up the MK 20 with the twin 20 mm anti-aircraft cannon, in case they want to stay with the 20 mm caliber.

Since the introduction of the new armored vehicles was originally planned for much earlier than now, the ammunition concept has to be reevaluated once again: the Bundeswehr will introduce the new weapon systems just before the mid-1990's. In the United States, however, the systems with the 25 mm armament have been supplied to the army beginning this year. In the Netherlands the 25 mm armament had already been introduced about six years ago. This indicates already that on the day the new weapons system is introduced to the Bundeswehr, the present ammunition 25 mm X 137 will certainly no longer be at the latest level of technology.

The concept of ammunition must also be thought through once again and revised. In any case, the hoped-for munitions family is supposed to fulfill the following requirements: the ability to exchange the ammunition with that of our NATO partners; sufficient ballistic capability against the expected threat; the realization of a weapon which can be exchanged for the present MK 20 Rh 202 with the lowest possible re-equipment costs.

An increase in efficiency is supposed to be possible yet in the future.

9328

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## FORCES COMMANDER URGES INCREASED FUNDS TO MEET MISSION

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 5 Feb 82 p 15

[Commentary by Timo Lipponen: "Tight Budget Will Result in an "Appendage Army'"]

[Text] Is there a danger that Finland's defense forces will become an appendage of the Soviet Army?

President Urho Kekkonen recently warned about the creation of just such an impression. The idea became timely once again when Defense Forces Commander Lauri Sutela became involved in the underestimated defense budget with some rather harsh words.

In assessing the trimmed down defense appropriations General Sutela pointed out on Monday that the situation is justified by, among other things, the credibility of our disarmament policy "just as if the most important obligation of our military defense is merely the peace time surveillance of our borders".

In a letter written to the previous defense commander, Yrjo Keinonen, President Kekkonen pointed out that our country's minimum defense capability should not be measured just on the basis that Finland can conduct negotiations for military assistance in accordance with the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement.

Who Is Responsible For Our Defense?

"An outside observer can receive the impression that Finland's defense forces are a kind of appendage of the Soviet Union's defense forces," wrote Kekkonen.

The president concluded his letter with a conclusion on this incorrect concept:

"It could be argued that our country's security strategy is built on the basis of Soviet military aid and that in the final count the Soviet Union will deal with a crisis situation."



Kekkonen was concerned about such incorrect arguments for a minimum defense capability and Sutela's criticism was directed at limiting the army's role only to peace time operations.

If the situation is thus, President Kekkonen's idea that we are becoming an appendage is more real than before.

#### Social Democratic Party Took a Step

At last summer's party congress the SDP decided not to support a real increase in defense funds. This in spite of the fact that the party's representatives approved the development line proposed the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee.

In discussing this year's state budget all the ruling parties went behind the decision of the SDP congress and even beyond it: defense funds were actually reduced.

This tight policy line was put into words by MP Jermu Laine, who accused the army of extraparliamentary pressure while at the same time supporting Finland's example as a leader in disarmament.

#### Kekkonen's Testament

In the Tamminiemi book, which has been mentioned as Urho Kekkonen's political testament, the task of the defense forces is clearly defined. It is the defense of the nation and the protection of its neutrality.

"The defense forces support foreign policy merely by their existence, naturally, so much the better the more effective they are," wrote the president.

The tight policy line approved by the parliament did not, of course, destroy our defense system, but it made it more difficult than before to execute a purposeful defense policy.

Even though recommendations for reduced defense funds would seem to be desirable for justifying an exemplary disarmament policy, the consequences can still be reflected in a completely different area: in the credibility of our foreign policy.

#### Self-Reliance Is the Best

The Parliamentary Defense Committee proceeded from the premise that Finland should defend its own territory. Even according to the YYA Agreement assistance is "demanded by necessity".

Parliamentary recommendations for reduced funds may over the long haul bring about the situation Kekkonen warned against. In the eyes of outsiders Finland in the final count does not want or is not able to defend itself and thus the consequences are directly transferred to the credibility of our foreign policy.

The defense committee emphasized, in particular, the significance of the so-called defense troops. According to the committee their necessity will become evident during a protracted military threat as relations between the superpowers become aggravated and lead them to the brink of war. In such a situation a high defense readiness is probably a good guarantee for our own reventive actions.

10576

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## PAPER BACKS SUTELA ON NEED FOR INCREASED ARMS BUDGET

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 3 Feb 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Minimized Expenditures"]

[Text] The new government will soon have to take a stand on preparations for next year's budget. In this connection the attitude toward defense expenditures, which in the budget for the current year were slashed below the minimum level recommended by the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee, will come up.

Defense Forces Commander, General Lauri Sutela, has this fall and winter several times used exceptionally strong language with respect to the present situation in our defense capability. He has characterized the weakening of the credibility of our defense capability as dangerous and irresponsible.

At the opening ceremonies of the national defense course on Monday General Sutela reiterated the fact that Finland has been an example of minimized defense expenditures during the whole postwar period. "It is only proper to ask who has followed our example," Sutela was compelled to state.

Now it will be interesting to see what kind of line will be adopted in the future in political quarters. Those positions and views which the new commander of the defense forces is adopting are of considerable significance. It is hoped that the highest leadership of our defense forces will not have to bear the responsibility for the credibility of our defense capability alone.

It should especially be remembered that military defense capability is not a desposable consumer item. It cannot be destroyed in a flash, but it can also not be built in a flash. Therefore, long-term views and planning are expected of the political leadership.

Finland does not need an army armed to the teeth, but it does need an army equipped with modern weapons. Therefore, each budget year is very important.

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CSO: 3107/67

MILITARY

GREECE

BRIEFS

TEA MILITIA REORGANIZATION--National Defense Undersecretary George Petsos on Monday announced measures for the reorganization of the TEA militia. The reorganization concerns the TEA units inside the country (Zone B) and not those in the frontier areas and the islands adjacent to foreign countries (Zone A). Regarding the country's interior, the strength of the militia units will be reduced to 10 per cent of their present strength. This reduced force will be the nucleus for the development of the TEA units in case of war. The arms now in the hands of TEA militiamen are to be handed over to military storehouses and given back to militiamen only when they are needed for exercises. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 10 Feb 82 p 4]

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